Re: CA "Accessible Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail Systems" standards posted

From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Tue Jun 15 2004 - 20:56:27 CDT

There are some interesting issues with this document. As Joe Hall
mentioned, it's not clear they apply to OVC at all. The first paragraph
has, "These standards shall only apply to DRE systems for which an
electronic record of the vote is created by the DRE and for which that
electronic record is considered the official record."

If the OVC system is understood as a ballot printer--not a DRE--then none of
this would be applicable. On the other hand, why would they be so
interested in knowing how we will meet these standards if they understood
they weren't applicable?

We will find out soon... should be interesting.

Alan D.

> It looks like the standards were written for the Avante system.
> I don't understand the rationale for not letting the voter touch the
> paper ballot. Also, how do you ensure that the earlier paper audit
> trails are not visible to the next voter.
> If the requirement for encasing the ballot so the voter does not
> touch it were removed, then that would be better for the OVC approach
> in California.
> Best regards,
> Arthur
> At 4:43 PM -0700 6/15/04, Alan Dechert wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> >Press release about it
> --
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA 94303-4507
> tel +1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
Received on Wed Jun 30 23:17:16 2004

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Jun 30 2004 - 23:17:30 CDT