RE: Spoiled ballots, forged ballots, destroyed ballots

From: John Payson <jpayson_at_circad_dot_com>
Date: Tue Jun 15 2004 - 17:18:23 CDT

-----Original Message-----
From: John Payson [mailto:jpayson_at_circad_dot_com]
Sent: Monday, June 14, 2004 8:07 PM
To: 'voting-project@lists.sonic.net'
Subject: RE: Spoiled ballots, forged ballots, destroyed
ballots

>>
Right... as the OVC design does very simply. We spot check a
percentage of ballots by comparing the scan against visual examination
(randomly selected).
<<

How are the ballots randomly selected? If one uses a magnet to randomly select
ball bearings out of a pile for examination to confirm that they're "all" made
out of steel, the test would pass even if many of the bearings in the pile were
made out of non-metalic material.

As for some of the other issues raised, most voters wouldn't have to worry
about submitting lists of numbers, etc. Indeed, in a large election 99.99% of
voters wouldn't bother to. But anyone who would be inclined to doubt the
integrity of the election would have the option (and anyone who wanted to
vocalize doubts could be directed to either participate in the process or shut
up).

I do think it should be somewhat noteworthy that the protocol I've described
requires a much lower level of trust of those involved than any other protocols
I've read, but perhaps the practical advantage isn't as large as it might seem:
while there may be cases where Republican and Democrat poll officials collude
against a candidate who isn't really popular with either party (the levels of
crossover votes--in both directions!--in the 1998 Illinois gubernatorial race
were pretty incredible), it is likely that those who would collude in such a
case would have the ability--regardless of protocol--to conduct "vote the dead"
fraud to a degree that would dwarf any tabulation fraud they might reasonably
attempt.
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Received on Wed Jun 30 23:17:16 2004

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