Re: Barcode Redux

From: David Mertz <voting-project_at_gnosis_dot_cx>
Date: Fri Jun 04 2004 - 18:26:28 CDT

On Jun 4, 2004, at 7:09 PM, Arthur Keller wrote:
> Where does all this information come from? The inputs are the voter
> and the vote enabling info (smart card, dumb card, activation code,
> whatever).

I entirely agree that a covert information channel requires a means to
get information *TO* that channel. Quite likely some hypothetical
malicious code in the ballot printer would indeed not have any
inappropriate information to work with in the first place, as we
currently envision procedures.

But remember you own mantra about redundancy, Arthur! Getting rid of a
covert channel at every stage is better than relying on preventing it
at only one procedural step.

> Note that if it weren't for us CS types complaining about the
> unreliability of DRE's, voters *would* trust them. So why would
> voters care about what's in the bar code when they can verify their
> vote is in the bar code?

Quite a few of the DRE skeptics are by no means CS types: Teresa Hommel
and Kim Alexander are two I met recently; Bev Harris is another
prominent example.
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Received on Wed Jun 30 23:17:07 2004

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