Crypto AG and machine rigging

From: Charlie Strauss <cems_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Tue Jun 01 2004 - 23:14:15 CDT

Here's a timely cautionary tale. At this moment there is a front page
story on the NY times that Ahmed Chalabi told the iranians,
truthfully, that the US was reading their most secret intel codes.
What the story does not tell is HOW they did it. After all, aren't
modern codes virtually unbreakable? And what the heck does this have
to do with Voting machines.

If you want to know, google for "crytpo AG Iran". saving you the
trouble, apparently the NSA persuaded the swiss company crypto AG to
put a backdoor in their encoding software. This is really remarkable
since the Swiss have a reputation for independence and trustworthy
management.

Or to put it another way, if the Swiss can rig a crypto machine even
though if the fact that they did so ever leaked it would destroy their
bussiness, whose to say a voting machine vendor would not take a
simmilar risk.

This of course is relevant to the Shamos paper where exhibit A is his
argument that voting machine vendors would never compromise their
market potential by ever allowing something like that in their codes.

off topic remark: by the way apparently Sadaam Hussein was using these
machines too. Think about it.
==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
Received on Wed Jun 30 23:17:01 2004

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Wed Jun 30 2004 - 23:17:29 CDT