Re: Voting Crypto Contest held by ES&S

From: charlie strauss <cems_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Wed Jul 25 2007 - 13:42:27 CDT

Rick, thanks for the responses. I'm mulling them. I do have one follow-up on the first question and your answer seemed to misunderstand what I asked.

-----Original Message-----

>1) How to prove your vote:
>> take a picture of the completed ballot with your cell-phone camera
>> before it is shredded. Take home the completed ballot.
>> i) It would be improbably that one could accidentally find two
>> pieces that matched correctly tht specified another vote pattern so
>> the picture is proof
>Obviously, if you can somehow be in the booth, looking over the voter's
>shoulder, you have a problem.. This isn't really any different.

To be more clear. I mean that if a voter wants to prove their vote, all they need to so is snap a picture of the filled out ballot pair. That picture plus the reciept (which is on line too and thus not forgable) would seem like a nearly certain proof of vote. For contrast the same is not true of the OVC or a paper ballot.

As for the shared secret system of keeping the keys, as I understand it, and I confess I'm not fully understanding all the modulo arithmetic that gets done (wiki kinda is confusing). It seems to me that there is ultimately one key that you may choose to escrow as a shared secret. But someone could acquire that one key either during the key generation process, or any time after the key decoded from escrow. is this right?

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Received on Tue Jul 31 23:17:06 2007

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