Re: Voting Crypto Contest held by ES&S

From: Ben Adida <ben_at_eecs_dot_harvard_dot_edu>
Date: Wed Jul 25 2007 - 10:03:33 CDT

charlie strauss wrote:
> Namely someone has to have the keys to the crypto, at least
> at some point in the process. So if key security gets penetrated, the
> jig is up. This is a common flaw with most crypto schemes: As the
> authority circle is shrunk to guard the data handling paths, a point for
> a central attack is born, ironically reducing the size of the conspiracy
> need to subvert the election.


This is, as I've mentioned before in discussions with you, false.

In most cryptographic voting schemes, the "authority circle" can, if
they all collude, discover how someone voted, but they cannot change the
way that person voted or otherwise influence the result. As long as
there is one citizen willing to verify the proofs, and one press outlet
willing to report it, any attempt at subversion can be found.

On the voter privacy front (which remains very important, of course),
the way one minimizes the chance that the authority circle will collude
is by making the circle contain a member of each political party
(including the small ones), so that, for any single voter, at least one
authority has that voter's interest at heart and won't collude.

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Received on Tue Jul 31 23:17:06 2007

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