From: Kathy Dopp <kathy_dot_dopp_at_gmail_dot_com>

Date: Thu Jul 20 2006 - 02:12:49 CDT

Date: Thu Jul 20 2006 - 02:12:49 CDT

NEDA may or may "not" be able to derive a better formulaic

approximation of the probability formula (We are using the same

original equation that we derived over a year ago to calculate audit

percentages that has been extensively peer-reviewed but are trying to

solve it for one of the variables). Frank and I are still working on

it, but a one-step exact solution is not looking hopeful. The election

integrity equation to solve has several factorials of the variable to

be solved for in it and it is thus difficult (or impossible?) to solve

directly.

The good news is that as precise as desired answer to the number of

vote counts to audit in order to have a desired degree of probability

of detecting outcome-altering vote miscount can be determined with a

computer program or by trial and error using a spreadsheet.

The new equation that I set up last week is only trivially different

than our extensively peer-reviewed and agreed to original probability

equation of over a year ago. I have merely introduced a small new

calculation to make the audit percentage detect outcome-altering vote

miscount.

The method Frank tried for solving the equation depends for its

precision, on the size of the number of total vote counts being a

large number, which is not true in many counties. I had given Frank

the formula to solve without sufficiently informing him of its

real-life constraints.

The great news is that a computer program to solve the "election

integrity" vote count audit equation will be a simple one - by working

backwards until the correct probability is obtained - almost like a

simple search algoritm that can be quickly narrowed down, with an

approximation function to specify exactly where to begin the search,

and a probability to check the accuracy of the results.

Having a computer program to solve the problem, rather than a simple

formula may make it more difficult to get it adopted as the standard -

but it is easily-explainable to anyone who knows any college-level

probability, and so the scientists of NIST, who set such standards,

will easily understand it.

I have updated NEDA's audit paper with an explanation and table in its

appendix, and the excell spreadsheet will explain it to most people.

http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/Paper_Audits.pdf

and

http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/paper-audits/ and get

AuditCalculator.xls

If anyone wants to take on the project of creating a program to

calculate the correct audit percentage for detecting outcome-altering

vote miscount, or fixing up the spreadsheet that now lets people

calculate it by trial and error, that would be terrific. I'm buried

without enough funding to hire any help.

-- ---- Kathy Dopp http://electionarchive.org National Election Data Archive Dedicated to Accurately Counting Elections Subscribe to announcements by emailing election-subscribe@uscountvotes.org Please donate or volunteer. "Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppressions of body and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day," wrote Thomas Jefferson in 1816 _______________________________________________ OVC-discuss mailing list OVC-discuss@listman.sonic.net http://lists.sonic.net/mailman/listinfo/ovc-discuss ================================================================== = The content of this message, with the exception of any external = quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain ==================================================================Received on Mon Jul 31 23:17:06 2006

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