Understanding difference between TLV, EML, VVPB and what the vendors want to flog as VVPAT

From: David Webber \(XML\) <"David>
Date: Fri Jul 01 2005 - 15:06:04 CDT


I think we are a long way past the threat that Diebold and crew
can add bolt-on VVPAT printers to their units and claim victory.

But - yes - this is a very real threat - that came out during the
HAVA/NIST work - and which I pushed back with TGDC
executive members individually and with submissions from
the OASIS side in particular.

That is why I was so excited that NIST spell this out in their
VVSG2 draft here on pages 96 thru 98.

Now - that's the good news, now the bad news, VVSG1 is
what EAC is now considering, not VVSG2! :-

And of course it is missing pages 96 thru 98 and a whole bunch
more. VVSG2 is due to go to EAC in September. We need to
help NIST make a strong case for the goodness they have in
VVSG2, and more.

Now we are thru commenting to GAO - next up is a submission
to EAC - of a similar nature - spelling out this and more.

Basically EAC need a proactive approach with methods designed
to not just certify equipment - but one that provides real protections
for the voting process - not just rubberstamp of vendor kit.

This has to be founded on the combo of VVPB and digital. This is
essentially what the TLV approach with EML is attempting to
enshrine as the fundamental principles behind voting systems.
And what I see OVC is doing to (sans EML, for now).

Now I do not personally care if NIST call it something else, and
everyone thinks they did all this - just so long as at the end of
the day VVSG2 and a much more robust certification process
emerges - that basically invalidates toilet roll printer style
approaches and other nonsense (chief on my list there is
also audio logs).

I provide a lot of this ammo' in the TLV primer at

Just for Bev Harris and her staffs FYI - paper only is a dog
that will not hunt - simply because HAVA mandates (its the
law) that you provide computer assisted voting - and so
manual-only systems technically *must* be replaced.

They had better figure out what type of system they would
rather see. Alot of the TrueVoteXX folks are betting on
scanned paper ballot machines. That's not a bad first
option. As the matrix in the TLV slides shows however,
standalone scanned paper (as our friends at Diebold show
with their system) has lots of scary problems too.

But I'm seeing that if people go to scanned ballots for 2006,
I'd rather that than standalone DRE, or DRE with VVPAT.

Scanned paper is one step on the path to full assisted
cast paper ballots, where the creation of the ballot is
through a verified and separate process, and then the
counting of the ballots themselves is able to be
verified on the backend (that's the biggest concern here
with standalone ballot scanners).


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Received on Sun Jul 31 23:17:10 2005

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