Re: Renewed anonymity concern in OVC design

From: Arthur Keller <arthur_at_kellers_dot_org>
Date: Thu Jul 08 2004 - 22:04:32 CDT

At 3:53 PM -0500 7/8/04, Douglas W. Jones wrote:
>On Jul 8, 2004, at 12:35 PM, David Mertz wrote:
>>The OVC ballot displays a prominent ballot-ID on every ballot.
>>This number (currently a four digit number) is used to store EBIs,
>>and to correlate EBIs with REBIs/ballots. I am not happy with this
>>Specifically, a four digit number displayed in human-readable form
>>is something that a voter can easily remember or write down.

At 3:53 PM -0500 7/8/04, Douglas W. Jones wrote:
>Indeed. This has always been one of the most troubling features of
>the "Dechert system", and the reason, for example, that we'd be
>unlikely to approve this system for use in Iowa.
>It's also one reason that I wish we weren't committed to developing
>"the OVC system", but rather, a family of interoperable open voting
>solutions that could include some variant of the "Dechert system" but
>could also include other components that supported other models of
>how a VVPT election could be conducted.

I think of the OVC system as Alan has proposed it (the "Dechert
system") as the starting point for what the various state
universities will build for HAVA money. I think that the threat and
security analysis should evaluate this and other VVPT models.

I would be happy to hear about other suggestions for these "other
components" and "other models of ... VVPT."

The trick is to define interface specifications that enable such

Best regards,

Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA  94303-4507
tel +1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
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Received on Sat Jul 31 23:17:07 2004

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