Re: [OVC-discuss] Integrating two solutions (related to the Calif. bill thread)

From: Edward Cherlin <echerlin_at_gmail_dot_com>
Date: Sat Jan 24 2009 - 03:56:50 CST

On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 11:01 AM, Ronald Crane <> wrote:
> That's good. But at least one concern -- the question of class certification
> -- is more pointed for the ballot-printer architecture than for the
> hand-filled-paper-ballot-with-open-source-scanner architecture. This is
> because class certification makes firmware-based attacks easier to mount
> than does individual-hardware certification, and such attacks are more
> difficult to detect in the ballot-printer architecture than in the scanner
> architecture, because the latter's results (the counts) can be effectively
> audited, while the former's (due to, e.g., presentation attacks, DoS
> attacks, etc.) are much less amenable to meaningful audits.

I can't make out what you think you are talking about. What do you
mean about a lack of meaningful auditability in ballot printers, where
you audit _the paper_, not just the machines? No matter what you might
in theory be able to hack in the hardware, if it produces correct
paper printouts showing the voter's intended votes there is no
problem, and if it doesn't, its failure can easily be detected by
voters with no technical knowledge.

> -R

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Received on Thu Jan 7 00:09:50 2010

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