From: Jerry Lobdill <lobdillj_at_charter_dot_net>

Date: Fri Jan 26 2007 - 19:27:45 CST

Date: Fri Jan 26 2007 - 19:27:45 CST

This problem has been dealt with. I began working on this problem in

July 2006. I have papers on the subject posted at NIST.

Considering Vote Count Distribution in Designing Election Audits Rev.

2, 11-26-06 , by Jerry Lobdill:

http://vote.nist.gov/Considering-Vote-Count-Distribution-in-Designing-Election-Audits-Rev-2-11-26-06.pdf

Election Audit Sampling Design It's Not Just About Sampling Without

Replacement 10-09-06, by Jerry Lobdill`:

http://vote.nist.gov/Election-Audit-Sampling-Plan-Design-Its-Not-Just-About-Sampling-Without-Replacement-10-09-06.pdf

At 06:27 PM 1/26/2007, you wrote:

*>The computations I'm discussing (e.g., Dopp's) use the
*

*>hypergeometric distribution to calculate the number of precincts to
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*>sample to obtain a given level of assurance (e.g., 99%) that there
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*>are no miscounted precincts in the population. But this approach is
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*>combinatorial, and thus appears to assume that all combinations of M
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*>miscounted precincts are equally likely, all combinations of M+1
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*>miscounted precincts are equally likely, etc. That assumption is
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*>invalid when we're discussing fraud. What if an attacker always hits
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*>the M largest precincts?
*

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Received on Tue Jan 1 14:12:49 2008

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