Re: [EILeg] [ei] Re: A 3-Step Audit Protocol w/ 99%confidence

From: Jerry Lobdill <lobdillj_at_charter_dot_net>
Date: Fri Jan 26 2007 - 19:27:45 CST

This problem has been dealt with. I began working on this problem in
July 2006. I have papers on the subject posted at NIST.

Considering Vote Count Distribution in Designing Election Audits Rev.
2, 11-26-06 , by Jerry Lobdill:
http://vote.nist.gov/Considering-Vote-Count-Distribution-in-Designing-Election-Audits-Rev-2-11-26-06.pdf

Election Audit Sampling Design It's Not Just About Sampling Without
Replacement 10-09-06, by Jerry Lobdill`:
http://vote.nist.gov/Election-Audit-Sampling-Plan-Design-Its-Not-Just-About-Sampling-Without-Replacement-10-09-06.pdf

At 06:27 PM 1/26/2007, you wrote:
>The computations I'm discussing (e.g., Dopp's) use the
>hypergeometric distribution to calculate the number of precincts to
>sample to obtain a given level of assurance (e.g., 99%) that there
>are no miscounted precincts in the population. But this approach is
>combinatorial, and thus appears to assume that all combinations of M
>miscounted precincts are equally likely, all combinations of M+1
>miscounted precincts are equally likely, etc. That assumption is
>invalid when we're discussing fraud. What if an attacker always hits
>the M largest precincts?

_______________________________________________
OVC-discuss mailing list
OVC-discuss@listman.sonic.net
http://lists.sonic.net/mailman/listinfo/ovc-discuss
==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
Received on Tue Jan 1 14:12:49 2008

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Tue Jan 01 2008 - 14:12:51 CST