Re: [Fwd: Computerworld story]

From: Arthur Keller <voting_at_kellers_dot_org>
Date: Fri Jan 20 2006 - 13:17:32 CST

Why was the Leon County system running such old and hackable
software? Shouldn't Diebold provide updates that prevent this

Have Diebold make available one of their current machines for the
same kind of testing. Current voting machines are protected by trade
secret and certified by companies paid for their work by the voting
machine vendor itself.

While optical scan ballots can be recounted, Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) voting machines without a paper trail cannot be
independently recounted. Does Diebold spokesman David Bear agree
that an accessible voter-verified paper audit trail should be part of
each DRE to allow such recounts and audit processes?

Best regards,
Arthur Keller
Board Secretary, Open Voting Consortium

At 11:36 AM -0700 1/20/06, Kathy Dopp wrote:
>Would someone more knowledgable than I please respond to this person please?
>Thank you. Kathy Dopp
>-------- Original Message --------
>Subject: Computerworld story
>Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2006 07:25:32 -0700
>From: Larry Singleton <>
>I think the Diebold responses at the end of this story have a lot of common
>sense behind them. Read them closely. Notice in particular the lines I
>bolded and highlighted.
>*Diebold Responds*
>Diebold has publicly denounced the Leon County tests as being invalid. In
>fact, the vendor contended that Leon County Elections Supervisor Ion
>Sancho's decision to sponsor the hacking attempts were potential violations
>of licensing agreements and intellectual property rights. In a letter to
>Sancho on June 8, Diebold said Sancho had committed a "very foolish and
>irresponsible act." In that same letter, Diebold said the May hack was akin
>to "leaving your car unlocked, with the windows down and keys left in the
>ignition and then acting surprised when your car is stolen or the interior
>Diebold spokesman David Bear responded to some of Thompson's claims about
>Diebold gear. The design of the equipment used in the Leon County
>demonstration dates back to the early 1990s, Bear said. *Diebold's current
>touch-screen voting machines have far more sophisticated security that would
>prevent this type of attack. *
>Additionally, Bear said, the older optical scan machines are only vulnerable
>to such a hack when normal security procedures are not followed. "*Even the
>older memory cards are sealed in the machines after pre-election testing is
>complete," he said.* "The cards are not given to third parties for 'hacking
>purposes' as was done during the demo. *If any of the seals are broken or
>there is any hint of a security breach, the paper ballots can be recounted.
>*Furthermore, many locations require a certain percentage of ballots be
>recounted even when there is no suspected fraud."
>He also said that Diebold regularly enhances its products to bolster
>security, and the enhancements are discussed, implemented, tested, certified
>and made available to customers. "This situation is no different," he said.
>"Procedures are available which fully protect against this style of attack."
>OVC-discuss mailing list

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Received on Mon Jan 8 20:24:33 2007

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