Re: A generic best practice documentfor NewMexicolegislators

From: Ed Kennedy <ekennedyx_at_yahoo_dot_com>
Date: Tue Jan 04 2005 - 20:42:45 CST

Hello Nils, (if I may be so familiar) The example you cited doesn't apparently deal with quantum entanglement and shows that eavesdropping is apparently possible using a man in the middle attack. I recently gave my book about quantum computing away to the San Diego Public Library so perhaps I may be missing something. However, I don't want to go out there on this issue for OVC so perhaps you can contact me privately. I will note that it is agreed that practical quantum computers are 1 to 2 decades away and that doesn't necessarily work well for the OVC time frame.

Thanks, Ed Kennedy
  ----- Original Message -----
  From: Nils Paz
  To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list
  Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2005 1:48 PM
  Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] A generic best practice documentfor NewMexicolegislators

  Quantum cryptography allows for absolutely secure communication as well as a means for breaking current cryptographic communication schemes. If you were to record all communications today and play them back when quantum computation was fully employed (2015~2020), then you would be able to decipher all those secrets in a matter of minutes rather than years.
  As far as quantum encryption, the mathematics tells that it is unbreakable because if you try to intercept the information you would collapse the state of the information in which it is entangled.
  Attached is a site with a short tutorial:

  . Regards


       "Edmund R. Kennedy" <>
        Sent by:
        01/04/2005 11:04 AM
        Please respond to Open Voting Consortium discussion list

                To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list <>
                Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] A generic best practice document for NewMexicolegislators

  Hello Nils:
  I thought the whole deal with quantum computers is that they essentially made encryption obsolete because they could easily break the hardest codes currently or soon to be available?
  Thanks, Ed Kennedy

  Nils Paz <> wrote:

  Your discussion with the cryptographer poses an interesting way of providing secure voting. If we were to use quantum cryptographic techniques, then it could be completely secure and each person (elegible to vote) would have a cryptographic pass to record their vote.

  . Regards

       Joseph Lorenzo Hall <>
        Sent by:
        01/04/2005 09:13 AM
        Please respond to joehall; Please respond to Open Voting Consortium discussion list
               To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list <>
               Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] A generic best practice document for NewMexicolegislators

  On Tue, 04 Jan 2005 11:31:00 -0500, Ken Pugh <> wrote:
> Then we have the following possibilities. Which of the possibilities should
> be considered innocent and which deserve investigation?

  I don't think any of these cases can be 100% innocent... that is,
  there is some degeneracy as you note. I'm afraid that they! should all
  be investigated (save a) of course).

> Sign-ins Computer Paper Error-rate
> a.) 1000 1000 1000 0
> b.) 1000 1000 999 .1
> c.) 1000 1000 1001 .1
> d.) 1000 999 1000 .1
> e.) 1000 999 999 .1
> f.) 1000 999 1001 .2
> g.) 1000 1001 1000 .1
> h.) 1000 1001 1001 .1
> i.) 1000 1001 999 .2
> a.) is the goal.
> Possible reasons for the others:
> b.) means someone didn't drop their receipt in t! he box

  b.) may also mean that someone fled (the term for signing in and
  leaving before voting) and one "attacker" was able to monkey with the
  computer totals. It could also mean that their vote, for whatever
  reason, didn't make it into the box (maybe it wasn't completely
  inserted and falls out, maybe someone with access to the ballot box
  removed it) or wasn't counted in the reconciliation of the paper
  ballots (maybe it was stuck inside the ballot box).

> e.) may mean someone walked in, registered, and didn't vote
> h.) may mean that some voter didn't get marked as checked in

  h.) may also mean that one voter was successfully voted twice. I know
  that this implicates secret ballot / ballot privacy concerns, but does
  it makes sense to include registration data in the reconciliation
  procedure? That is, as Doug has pointed out is done in Great Britain,
  a unique identifier is issued to the voter upon regist! ration and kept
  as a state secret... then the voter enters this unique identifier as
  the "ballot style" indicator when they approach the EVM. Granted, I
  can't see how this would work on closed-source EVMs... there would
  just be too much secrecy to convince savvy voters that the unique
  identifier wasn't being used in nefarious ways.

  There's another angle on this mentioned by a cryptographer I spoke to
  briefly here at UC Berkeley... he mentioned that voting is premised
  upon being able to go somewhere and deposit something (a record of
  your vote)... why not make voting be about taking something away?
  That is, why not have two very large pools of random numbers (cleverly
  created, of course) and when you go vote, your ballot lists (and only
  lists) the random numbers you've "taken" from each race's pool of
  numbers. Of course, the mapping between the numbers and candidates
  would be the link that needs to be kept secret by some organization
  like the EAC. You could imagine that one could go to an EAC website
  and enter one or more of their random numbers and see if their vote
  was counted (but not for whom).

  I'm babbling.

> g.) and i.) could be a combination of b.) and h.)
> c.), d.), f.) need some explanation.

  These seem like classic ballot box stuffing of one kind or another.

> The b.), e.) and h.) errors are the type of human errors I'm referring to.

  I think they're only human errors assuming that the computer element
  is functioning perfectly.


  Joseph Lorenzo Hall
  UC Berkeley, SIMS PhD Student
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Received on Sat Jan 7 22:28:56 2006

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