Re: A generic best practice document for NewMexicolegislators

From: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joehall_at_gmail_dot_com>
Date: Tue Jan 04 2005 - 11:13:04 CST

On Tue, 04 Jan 2005 11:31:00 -0500, Ken Pugh <kpughmisc@pughkilleen.com> wrote:
>
> Then we have the following possibilities. Which of the possibilities should
> be considered innocent and which deserve investigation?

I don't think any of these cases can be 100% innocent... that is,
there is some degeneracy as you note. I'm afraid that they should all
be investigated (save a) of course).

> Sign-ins Computer Paper Error-rate
>
> a.) 1000 1000 1000 0
> b.) 1000 1000 999 .1
> c.) 1000 1000 1001 .1
>
> d.) 1000 999 1000 .1
> e.) 1000 999 999 .1
> f.) 1000 999 1001 .2
>
> g.) 1000 1001 1000 .1
> h.) 1000 1001 1001 .1
> i.) 1000 1001 999 .2
>
> a.) is the goal.
> Possible reasons for the others:
>
> b.) means someone didn't drop their receipt in the box

b.) may also mean that someone fled (the term for signing in and
leaving before voting) and one "attacker" was able to monkey with the
computer totals. It could also mean that their vote, for whatever
reason, didn't make it into the box (maybe it wasn't completely
inserted and falls out, maybe someone with access to the ballot box
removed it) or wasn't counted in the reconciliation of the paper
ballots (maybe it was stuck inside the ballot box).

> e.) may mean someone walked in, registered, and didn't vote
> h.) may mean that some voter didn't get marked as checked in

h.) may also mean that one voter was successfully voted twice. I know
that this implicates secret ballot / ballot privacy concerns, but does
it makes sense to include registration data in the reconciliation
procedure? That is, as Doug has pointed out is done in Great Britain,
a unique identifier is issued to the voter upon registration and kept
as a state secret... then the voter enters this unique identifier as
the "ballot style" indicator when they approach the EVM. Granted, I
can't see how this would work on closed-source EVMs... there would
just be too much secrecy to convince savvy voters that the unique
identifier wasn't being used in nefarious ways.

There's another angle on this mentioned by a cryptographer I spoke to
briefly here at UC Berkeley... he mentioned that voting is premised
upon being able to go somewhere and deposit something (a record of
your vote)... why not make voting be about taking something away?
That is, why not have two very large pools of random numbers (cleverly
created, of course) and when you go vote, your ballot lists (and only
lists) the random numbers you've "taken" from each race's pool of
numbers. Of course, the mapping between the numbers and candidates
would be the link that needs to be kept secret by some organization
like the EAC. You could imagine that one could go to an EAC website
and enter one or more of their random numbers and see if their vote
was counted (but not for whom).

I'm babbling.

> g.) and i.) could be a combination of b.) and h.)
>
> c.), d.), f.) need some explanation.

These seem like classic ballot box stuffing of one kind or another.

> The b.), e.) and h.) errors are the type of human errors I'm referring to.

I think they're only human errors assuming that the computer element
is functioning perfectly.

Joe

-- 
Joseph Lorenzo Hall
UC Berkeley, SIMS PhD Student
http://pobox.com/~joehall/
blog: http://pobox.com/~joehall/nqb2/
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Received on Sat Jan 7 22:28:56 2006

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