Re: Campaign Letter

From: Dennis <dpaull_at_svpal_dot_org>
Date: Sat Jan 24 2004 - 20:42:49 CST

Hi Alan,

This is a very good start, but I would be very careful with the
grammer as you are likely to be quoted out of context. Think about a
reporter selecting one or two paragraphs not of your choosing.

As an example, you use the word "we" in two contexts. In the first
paragraphs, you use it to mean "the country". In later paragraphs, you
mean it to be "OVC". I would use other words when you mean the country
and reserve "we" for OVC.

Dennis

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
At 05:02 PM 1/24/2004 -0800, you wrote:
>This is a follow up to a message I wrote a week ago regarding our
>campaigners' database. We need to hone our message if we're going to get
>through to the people we need to reach this year.
>
>Here is a draft of a template for a letter that we could use in our
>campaign. Slightly different versions could go to office seekers,
>activists, and financial contributors.
>
>Your comments appreciated. What could be cut? What is missing? Do you
>have specific wording you think would be better?
>
>Thanks.
>
>Alan D.
>
>*********
>A little less than four years ago, the voting system in the United States
>was front-page news for weeks and weeks. The public learned the painful
>truth: instead of "every vote counted," the voting system was rife with
>inaccuracy, mismanagement, and inequity.
>
>It was widely acknowledged that while great advances in technology have been
>made over the past 40 years, the voting system has not kept up. Will we be
>able to say that the problem has been resolved for the 2004 election?
>
>Absolutely not. A lot of money has been spent, and a lot of people have
>studied the problem. However, a strong case can be made that the voting
>system is actually less secure than ever, and that we are proceeding in the
>wrong direction.
>
>Scientists have, for years, warned that while purely electronic voting may
>appear attractive in many ways, security concerns should rule out paperless
>Direct Record Electronic (DRE) voting machines as an option. Election
>officials and other decision makers - even the ones that are fairly astute
>technically - have little knowledge of the types of tricks that can be
>played with computers. An election result with these types of machines is
>virtually impossible to audit. Recounts would become meaningless since
>there is no conclusive evidence that the electronic record of a vote matches
>what the voter cast.
>
>The bipartisan Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) allocates billions of
>dollars for new voting equipment. A small percentage of this money (less
>than one percent) is to be spent on the development of new voting
>technology. However, the R&D effort was given little attention while
>jurisdictions plowed ahead purchasing the new and very expensive paperless
>electronic systems. We are moving toward a voting system exactly like what
>the scientists have said we should not have. If we continue on this path,
>we could wind up with a system where some highly motivated and clever inside
>conspiracy might be able to alter enough of the electronic votes to swing an
>election, and get away without a trace.
>
>Many scientists and engineers are working to bring this issue to the
>attention of the public. What election year issue could be more important
>than ensuring that the voting system works correctly? There are solutions,
>but we need your support. And we need your help to make this election issue
>one that the candidates have to address.
>
>The Open Voting Consortium is drawing on the expertise of many of the top
>scientists and engineers interested in the field of voting technology. We
>know how we can have election results that can be fully audited with paper
>ballots. And it will be far less expensive than the proprietary blackbox
>systems. We are fighting entrenched interests but with your help, we can
>succeed.
>
>We need ...
>[insert call to action]
>
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Received on Mon Jan 10 00:48:14 2005

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