Re: Paperless voting Re: OVC-discuss Digest, Vol 28, Issue 25

From: Richard C. Johnson <dick_at_iwwco_dot_com>
Date: Wed Feb 14 2007 - 16:13:58 CST

VVPB is simply a paper ballot, the official ballot in an election. At a minimum, there will be handicapped voters using touch screens to generate ballots, which will then be fed through precinct scanners. Precinct scanners are by far the most popular means of voting in the US and, except for handicapped voters, all ballots will be marked by the voter's own hand. Using ballot markers for non-handicapped voters is expensive, redundant, and rare. I agree with Phil that in almost all instances the ballot should be marked directly by the voter.

Proprietary software used in precinct scanners, however, is now used to count the paper ballots. So...paper ballots are just the first step. The second critical step is to use Open Source software in the scanners and computers. The third step, still some ways off, is to have standard, Open Design hardware (computers and scanners) used. Otherwise, in step two, the use of COTS hardware helps to insure quality and voting-neutral manufacture until step three is feasible.

-- Dick

Phil Fry <> wrote: I don't know the definition of a VVPB, other than a Voter-Verified Paper Ballot. Given the context of the email below, it seems like it is something that could be produced starting with a DRE. But there is no way I know of to be sure the ballot is verified unless the voter fills it out by hand.
 The OVC approach produces a ballot that can be hand counted or scanned. But it doesn't force verification. A voter could take the printed ballot and put it in the stack/box for scanning, or even scan it him/her self without ever verifying the ballot. And in the case where a VVPB is read by an OS device, the voter is not normally (I don't know the OVC plan in detail) given feedback on how the ballot was read by the device. So a second verification step is really called for.
 Richard C. Johnson wrote: So called "paper trails" have a record of having failed in actual use, being defective by design and not liable to fixing. They are flimsy and totally inappropriate for any archival record. It is a grave error to see them enshrined in the Holt Bill as a sop to those manufacturers who wish to use them to diffuse legitimate criticism. VVPAT is not enough; VVPB is what must be required.
 -- Dick
   John Burik <> wrote: While Holt II permits voting with paper ballots counted either via optical
 scan or by hand, its minimum standards permits DREs with verifiable paper
 trails of which at best only 10% will be counted in an audit. Its Sec. 327
 permits reliance on machine counts in the presence of clear and convincing
 evidence the paper records have been compromised.
 I do not support AS WRITTEN.
 John, CASE
 On 2/14/07 3:00 PM, ""
> Today's Topics:
> 1. Fw: Ban paperless voting (Edmund R. Kennedy)
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2007 11:44:30 -0800 (PST)
> From: "Edmund R. Kennedy"
> Subject: [OVC-discuss] Fw: Ban paperless voting
> To: Open Voting Consortium discussion list
> Message-ID: <>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>Dear MoveOn member,
> Too many voters are still stuck with paperless electronic voting
> machines?machines
> that are vulnerable to tampering and malfunction.
 John Burik MEd, PCC
 OVC-discuss mailing list

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Received on Wed Feb 28 23:17:17 2007

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