Re: code validation? - rom based attacks

From: Keith Copenhagen <K_at_copetech_dot_com>
Date: Wed Feb 23 2005 - 13:41:19 CST

Audit, Audit, Audit.

If the totals arew changed, you have to go back to the Voter Verified
Paper Audit Trail.
You have to statistically validate the tabulation from the VVPAT, to
detect malicious or
accidental vote changes.

See prior note about using PKI web of trust/delegation of authority to
provide round trip
audit log "proof" of correctness.

On Wed, 23 Feb 2005 11:00:11 -0800, Ron Crane <voting@lastland.net> wrote:

>>>> There's a problem here. There must be a known set of vendors who have
>>>> earned trust via the review process you described. Let's posit that
>>>> OVC is the only such vendor initially
>>>
>>> Nah... OVC is more like a certifying standards body. Voting is very
>>> decentralized in the USA, and it's almost certain to be a lot of
>>> different vendors in different locales. Think of us like OASIS, IEEE,
>>> or W3C: we might provide a reference implementation--and vendors might
>>> even use our code (probably should do so to insure code quality and
>>> auditing)--but vendors can compete for a particular service contract.
>>>
>>> But certainly qualifying as a vendor of Public Software should be
>>> subject to laws (some OVC'ers are working on this in various states).
>
> There's another, more insidious problem with OVC not being the sole
> vendor. That is, since elections officials will demand turn-key systems,
> vendors will provide hardware. It would be easy for a vendor to include
> a ROM in its hardware containing a cheating version of the software. The
> hardware easily could pretend to boot from the CD containing the
> verified software, and the cheating software could perform – except for
> the cheating – exactly as if it were the verified software. If the
> hardware had, say, wireless networking capability, the timing and nature
> of the cheating could even be controlled remotely [1].
>
> Even if OVC were to enter the business of certifying voting machines
> produced using its code, it would be hard-pressed to detect this kind of
> cheating. A vendor could supply OVC with non-cheating machines to test.
> And even if it didn't, black-box tests of a cheating machine would be
> vanishingly unlikely to discover the cheating.
>
> -Ron
>
> [1] Long-distance WIFI is coming soon to a computer near you.
> http://news.com.com/2100-1033-959924.html?tag=fd_top .
>
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>

-- 
Keith Copenhagen
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Received on Sun Feb 27 17:17:12 2005

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