Re: code validation?

From: Ron Crane <voting_at_lastland_dot_net>
Date: Wed Feb 23 2005 - 13:12:09 CST

>> I'm afraid I don't see EEVV's "numerous new vulnerabilities". It's
>> the exact same vulnerability as widespread absentee/mail-in voting,
>> no more and no less. And EEVV accepts that vulnerability for the very
>> good reason of increasing the voting system's security and
>> transparency. Why shouldn't any citizen be able to tabulate the
>> election? It's the ultimate in "open source" voting.
> There are better ways for any citizen to be able to tabulate the
> election that don't violate the time-honored American tradition of
> Ballot Secrecy.

EEVV doesn't violate ballot secrecy unless the voter reveals her unique
id to someone else. This is no different than absentee or mail-in
voting, both of which are well-accepted procedures, and the use of
which is increasing.

> The new mathematical encryption key pairs (e-ballot & a key the voter
> could take home) combined with:
> 1. An initial electronic count using a DRE like ballot printer or
> generator that creates electronic ballots that can be publicly
> released on the Internet
> 2. An op-scanable ballot
> 3. An op-scan re-count of the voter verified paper ballots
> 4. Publicly released open source software for counting ballots
> The encrypted electronic ballots which do not violate voter anonymity,
> could be released to the Internet and any one with the technical
> expertise or who had money to hire those w/ expertise could
> independently count the original electronic ballots.

Could you explain this in more detail? I don't quite follow it; perhaps
I need more coffee.

> This system, however, is still a long way off, but IMO we do "not"
> want to have a system that allows widespread vote buying.

Any system that allows a voter securely to verify that her vote was
included in the final tabulation seems, by definition, to allow her to
share that information with another. If your approach encrypts the
voter's selections, then prints the encrypted value by another key
(given to the voter) in the newspaper, that's not secure. The software
could print any encrypted value it wants. Just because the one in the
newspaper matches the one the voter received when she voted doesn't
mean that her votes were properly tabulated.

And I still don't see how EEVV is any worse with respect to vote buying
than absentee systems or Oregon's mail-in system.


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Received on Sun Feb 27 17:17:12 2005

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