Re: code validation?

From: Kathy Dopp <kathy_at_uscountvotes_dot_org>
Date: Wed Feb 23 2005 - 12:10:52 CST

Ron Crane wrote:

>
> I'm afraid I don't see EEVV's "numerous new vulnerabilities". It's the
> exact same vulnerability as widespread absentee/mail-in voting, no
> more and no less. And EEVV accepts that vulnerability for the very
> good reason of increasing the voting system's security and
> transparency. Why shouldn't any citizen be able to tabulate the
> election? It's the ultimate in "open source" voting.

There are better ways for any citizen to be able to tabulate the
election that don't violate the time-honored American tradition of
Ballot Secrecy.

The new mathematical encryption key pairs (e-ballot & a key the voter
could take home) combined with:

1. An initial electronic count using a DRE like ballot printer or
generator that creates electronic ballots that can be publicly released
on the Internet
2. An op-scanable ballot
3. An op-scan re-count of the voter verified paper ballots
4. Publicly released open source software for counting ballots

The encrypted electronic ballots which do not violate voter anonymity,
could be released to the Internet and any one with the technical
expertise or who had money to hire those w/ expertise could
independently count the original electronic ballots.

This system, however, is still a long way off, but IMO we do "not" want
to have a system that allows widespread vote buying.

Best,

Kathy

_______________________________________________
OVC discuss mailing lists
Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
Received on Sun Feb 27 17:17:11 2005

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Sun Feb 27 2005 - 17:17:13 CST