Re: NPR Show on e-voting, Raba report

From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Wed Feb 11 2004 - 17:24:32 CST

David, I was typing mine when you sent yours. I didn't see it until after I
sent mine.

Thanks.

Alan

----- Original Message -----
From: "David Jefferson" <d_jefferson@yahoo.com>
To: <voting-project@lists.sonic.net>
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2004 3:05 PM
Subject: Re: [voting-project] NPR Show on e-voting, Raba report

> Alan,
>
> I sent a reply to this list. Did you not rfeceive it?
>
> David
>
> --- Alan Dechert <alan@openvotingconsortium.org> wrote:
> > Jan,
> >
> > > My answer has been no, primarily because of the security
> > problems. But
> > > even if those can be solved, I have said that it would be
> > unlikely - at
> > > least if it means remote unattended internet voting. ...
> > >
> > Quite right.
> >
> > > The primary reason would be that this could make it possible
> > for
> > > a voter to prove to someone else how the votes have been
> > cast. ....
> > >
> > I believe there are several reasons remote unattended Internet
> > voting will
> > never work (or never work very well) even if the software
> > issues are
> > solved..
> >
> > The possibility of proving the vote to someone else is
> > certainly one of
> > them. However, absentee ballots have the same problem--and
> > they're widely
> > used. One thing widely demonstrated here in the U.S. of A is
> > that just
> > because some procedure in the voting system is incredibly bad,
> > it doesn't
> > mean it won't be done that way. The more that
> > scientific-minded people look
> > at the system, the more amazing the voting system
> > appears--amazingly arcane,
> > idiosyncratic, quirky, goofy, and just plain bad. I was
> > talking with Matt
> > Bishop today (UC Davis CS Prof and one of the authors of the
> > Raba report).
> > He has delved deeply into the voting system in recent years
> > and is amazed at
> > one thing he has NOT found: Namely, S-C-I-E-N-C-E. This is
> > what we are
> > proposing to do. We are proposing a large-scale scientific
> > investigation of
> > all these issues. Nothing like this has ever been done. A
> > lot of people
> > got the impression that Caltech/MIT folks were going to do
> > that but it
> > really didn't happen. They wrote a few reports--some more
> > useful than
> > others.
> >
> > Back to remote unattended Internet voting ... there is another
> > serious
> > problem I see: You will never be able to identify the voter.
> > How do you
> > know the husband is not casting his wife's ballot too? This
> > voting model
> > would be highly susceptible to coersion. That is, this model
> > would
> > faciliate a dominant head of household--or even an
> > employer--that wants to
> > control the votes of others.
> >
> > Remote *ATTENDED* Internet Voting would not have all the
> > advantages of
> > unattended voting, but it could at least solve the problem of
> > knowing the
> > voter. I don't believe that unattended voting is worth
> > studying, but
> > attended Internet voting might be worth studying in some
> > detail--especially
> > a system that produces a paper ballot besides the electronic
> > ballot image.
> >
> > David Jefferson one of the main experts in this field, and
> > maybe he could
> > give us a little summary. David, are you there?
> >
> > --Alan D.
> >
> > > Implications of this may be:
> > >
> > > * It can create a market for politically uninterested
> > people to sell
> > > their votes.
> > >
> > > * It opens up for pressures and threats: "Vote for me as
> > Dog Catcher,
> > > or you'll get your knee caps broken!"
> > >
> > > From what I have read about the problems with internet
> > voting, it only
> > > concerns the usual security problems, and not the ones I
> > mentioned above.
> > > It would be interesting to hear the view of Douglas Jones,
> > or other voting
> > > experts, about this.
> > >
> > > /Jan
> > >
> >
>
>
==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
Received on Sun Feb 29 23:17:02 2004

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Sun Feb 29 2004 - 23:17:02 CST