Re: How dark is a mark?

From: Richard Carback <rick_dot_carback_at_gmail_dot_com>
Date: Thu Dec 20 2007 - 09:42:33 CST

>> You might be able to jam multiple printed ballots into the scanner
>> at the same time (the voter still has private physical access).
> Most current precinct count scanners defend against this by measuring
> the paper thickness of the ballots they scan -- for example, by shining
> light through the ballot and seeing how much it is attenuated. We
> know how to defend against this approach to cheating.
The physical protections would have to be thought out pretty well and
then tested. You aren't trying to get the scanner to scan multiple
ballots as much as you are trying to bypass the scanning mechanism and
forcing ballots into the box it is protecting (assuming the model was
one where the scanner would hold on to the ballot, give the voter a
chance to review before accepting, and then moving the ballot into a
ballot box). A model where poll workers could watch the scanner part is
better in this respect because the voter doesn't have private physical

Maybe the voter would scan the ballot, get the ballot back, go into a
review booth, press yes or no, and then, if the voter accepts the
result, put the ballot back into the scanner. If they don't, the process
is reset, and they can rescan another ballot or the same ballot with marks.

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Received on Mon Dec 31 23:17:07 2007

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