Fwd: Re: [EILeg] Cascading Audits

From: Jerry Lobdill <lobdillj_at_charter_dot_net>
Date: Wed Dec 13 2006 - 16:22:33 CST

Based on Ron's raising the "Cascading Audits" issue here as well as
on the EI Legislation list, I should post my response to that here also.

>Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2006 16:16:52 -0600
>To: "Ronald Crane" <voting@lastland.net>, EI Legislation List
><eileg@lists.sonic.net>
>From: Jerry Lobdill <lobdillj@charter.net>
>Subject: Re: [EILeg] Cascading Audits
>
>At 02:38 PM 12/13/2006, you wrote:
>>Jurisdictions will object strenuously to the idea that the
>>detection of a single miscounted precinct should trigger a full
>>recount of the entire affected jurisdiction (e.g., imagine
>>recounting California because something went wrong in the U.S.
>>Senate race in a single precinct having 300 registered voters). The
>>cascading audit scheme attempts to address this objection while
>>still providing an effective audit. I think that jurisdictions will
>>be much more likely to accept the cascading audit than the
>>full-recount-on-a-single-miscount scheme that you've proposed.
>>
>>-R
>Ron,
>
>You have totally misinterpreted what I said, and I am almost certain
>that you haven't read any of my papers either.
>
>How in the world have you concluded that I would have the entire
>state of California recounted because of discovery of a single
>corrupted precinct?
>
>If a single precinct IN A COUNTY is found corrupted in a sample
>selected from the population of ALL precincts in the COUNTY that are
>voting in the race being audited, this precipitates a full hand
>recount of ALL precincts in the COUNTY that are voting in the
>race. If a race being audited spans 10 counties, then all the
>precincts involved constitute the population from which the sample
>is selected. Any corrupted precinct precipitates a full hand
>recount IN THAT COUNTY. The reason for this is that a wholesale
>attack is not spread from county to county or from the state level
>to the counties. It is launched independently in each county in
>which it appears. There may be a few refinements yet to be made in
>the procedure for sample selection, but I assure you they do not
>involve your cascading audits idea as expressed below.
>
>Now to your very first statement above, we, the people, are the
>proper "deciders" in this matter, not the jurisdictions (i.e., the
>election administrations involved).
>
>As best I can tell, you came up with your cascading audits notion
>off the top of your head yesterday. Please read what has been
>published by myself, Howard Stanislevic, and Kathy Dopp, and
>reconsider your idea.
>
>Regards,
>
>Jerry Lobdill
>
>
>>On Wed, 13 Dec 2006 09:35:43 -0600, Jerry Lobdill wrote
>> > This is a response to both Arthur and Ron re auditing.
>> >
>> > This business of "further auditing" seems to me to be misguided
>> thinking. In the audit scheme that I have proposed the kind of
>> miscount and the race in which it occurs cannot in any reasonable
>> analysis be considered an ambiguous result that would be cleared
>> up by more auditing. If it occurs once in a sample that is
>> properly sized and randomly selected it should be considered
>> sufficient evidence to trigger a full recount. You don't even
>> need to audit the complete set of precincts in the sample once
>> you've found the first precinct that satisfies the detection criterion.
>> >
>> > We can discuss this further if you don't agree.
>> >
>> > Jerry Lobdill
>> >
>> > At 02:00 PM 12/12/2006, eileg-request@lists.sonic.net wrote:
>> >
>>>From: "Ronald Crane" <voting@lastland.net>
>>> > Precedence: list
>>> > MIME-Version: 1.0
>>> > To: eileg@lists.sonic.net
>>> > Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2006 20:14:31 -0800
>>> > Message-ID: <20061212035633.M61444@lastland.net>
>>> > Content-Type: text/html;
>>> > charset=iso-8859-1
>>> > Subject: [EILeg] Cascading audits
>>> > Message: 12
>>> >
>>> > An important question raised by audits is what further auditing
>>> should we do if we discover precincts that miscounted their
>>> votes. It strikes me that a good approach might be like this:
>>> >
>>> > 1. Reduce the winning candidate's effective margin of victory
>>> in accord with the results of the audit from the miscounted precincts.
>>> >
>>> > 2. Treat the precincts that were not audited the first time
>>> around as if they represent a new election.
>>> >
>>> > 3. Iterate the audit, calculating the number of precincts that
>>> we need to audit to have p=0.99 of discovering at least one
>>> miscounted precinct (given the new margin of victory and the
>>> minimum number of precincts that an attacker would have to flip
>>> to gain victory), and randomly selecting the new precincts to audit.
>>> >
>>> > I haven't carefully analyzed this procedure, but it seems that,
>>> when it terminates, we will have at least p=0.99 assurance that
>>> there are not enough miscounted precincts to flip the election.
>>> >
>>> > It also seems reasonably economical, avoiding the big hit of
>>> simply auditing all the precincts when we discover some number of
>>> miscounted ones.
>>> >
>>> > Comments?
>>> >
>>> > -R
>>> > From: "Ronald Crane" <voting@lastland.net>
>>> > Precedence: list
>>> > MIME-Version: 1.0
>>> > To: "Ronald Crane" <voting@lastland.net>, eileg@lists.sonic.net
>>> > References: <20061212035633.M61444@lastland.net>
>>> > In-Reply-To: <20061212035633.M61444@lastland.net>
>>> > Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2006 00:23:53 -0800
>>> > Message-ID: <20061212082107.M25279@lastland.net>
>>> > Content-Type: text/html;
>>> > charset=iso-8859-1
>>> > Subject: Re: [EILeg] Cascading audits
>>> > Message: 13
>>> >
>>> > 1. Reduce the winning candidate's effective margin of victory
>>> in accord with the results of the audit from the miscounted precincts.
>>> >
>>> > 2. Treat the precincts that were not audited the first time
>>> around as if they represent a new election.
>>> >
>>> > 3. Iterate the audit, calculating the number of precincts that
>>> we need to audit to have p=0.99 of discovering at least one
>>> miscounted precinct (given the new margin of victory and the
>>> minimum number of precincts that an attacker would have to flip
>>> to gain victory), and randomly selecting the new precincts to audit.
>>> > To be more explicit:
>>> >
>>> > 4. Repeat 1-3 until either an audit finds no more miscounted
>>> precincts or you've audited all the precincts.
>>> >
>>> > -R
>>> >
>>> > At 8:14 PM -0800 12/11/06, Ronald Crane wrote:
>>> >
>>>>It also seems reasonably economical, avoiding the big hit of
>>>>simply auditing all the precincts when we discover some number of
>>>>miscounted ones.
>>>
>>> > There's a big thing missing from the issue of recounting some
>>> or recounting all precincts argument. And that is determining
>>> the source of the problem in the first place. I suggest that
>>> some absolute threshold, such as an error rate exceeding a
>>> certain number or percentage of votes result in an evaluation of
>>> the causes of the error. This should be separate from the
>>> decision to recount for the purposes of determining the winner.
>>> >
>>> > Furthermore, this issue is independent of technology. It
>>> applies equally to HCPB, where it might uncover a counting
>>> conspiracy among volunteer counters.
>>> >
>>> > Best regards,
>>> > Arthur
>>
>(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is
>distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior
>interest in receiving the included information for research and
>educational purposes. ProgressiveNews2Use has no affiliation
>whatsoever with the originator of this article nor is
>ProgressiveNews2Use endorsed or sponsored by the originator.)
>
>"Go to Original" links are provided as a convenience to our readers
>and allow for verification of authenticity. However, as originating
>pages are often updated by their originating host sites, the
>versions posted on ProgressiveNews2Use may not match the versions
>our readers view when clicking the "Go to Original" links.

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is
distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior
interest in receiving the included information for research and
educational purposes. ProgressiveNews2Use has no affiliation
whatsoever with the originator of this article nor is
ProgressiveNews2Use endorsed or sponsored by the originator.)

"Go to Original" links are provided as a convenience to our readers
and allow for verification of authenticity. However, as originating
pages are often updated by their originating host sites, the versions
posted on ProgressiveNews2Use may not match the versions our readers
view when clicking the "Go to Original" links.

_______________________________________________
OVC-discuss mailing list
OVC-discuss@listman.sonic.net
http://lists.sonic.net/mailman/listinfo/ovc-discuss

==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
Received on Sun Dec 31 23:17:13 2006

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Sun Dec 31 2006 - 23:17:16 CST