Re: open-audit elections

From: Charlie Strauss <cems_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Wed Dec 13 2006 - 01:29:20 CST

On Dec 13, 2006, at 12:13 AM, Ben Adida wrote:

> Charlie Strauss wrote:
>>> Cryptography is specifically the science of *not* delegating
>>> power or
>>> trust to anyone.
>> This is meaningless without an example.

> if you prefer an actual system to think about, you can
> consider the latest VoteHere system.

Okay then, VoteHERE.
1) How do we solve the key control issue? If the key leaks, or is
broken, anytime between now and infinity all the ballots can be
identified with individual voters. What's the design principle that
fixes this?

2) How does the voter verify at the poll that his receipt is an
encoding of his chocies and not something else?
i) example 1:
Let's suppose that the vote here system used a paper ballot opscan
input. What happens when there's a misscan? does the votehere
receipt in anyway tell the voter that his ballot was misread?
ii) example 2: Same question if it's a touchscreen that is

3) when the voter calls City hall and deterimes he receipt was
present, what exactly is that telling him? How does this prove his
ballot was counted or counted as cast?

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Received on Sun Dec 31 23:17:12 2006

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