Re: Transparent Tabulator (take 2)

From: Ronald Crane <voting_at_lastland_dot_net>
Date: Tue Dec 12 2006 - 19:31:08 CST

On Tue, 12 Dec 2006 14:47:48 -0800, Bob Donner wrote
> I have generated a brief (7 slides) PDF outlining the basic concepts
> of the Transparent Tabulator I am proposing for use as a central
> tabulator. I appreciate people taking the time to read the proposal
> and giving me any feedback, comments or questions.
> ...

The TT, as described in your slides, increases complexity and introduces a
great deal of additional hardware, firmware, and software, all of which can be
attacked. Additionally the network connection can be attacked. And the ballot
marker can be attacked and made to alter voters' selections, which could
invalidate further hand audits.

Additionally, the TT's primary outputs will be "transparent" only to those
with extensive experience designing or debugging hardware. Only a tiny
fraction of the population has these skills.

There're also some practicality issues. A run-of-the-mill Pentium 4 might
execute 10^9 instructions/sec. Wading through even a tiny fraction of its bus
transactions would take forever unless you have a very good idea of what
you're looking for. Alas, software or firmware attacks aren't going to have
the kinds of signatures that you'd easily be able to locate from this kind of
data. Also, BTW, at 10^9 transactions/sec and probably hundreds of
bits/transaction (e.g., all signal lines in/out of the CPU), you'll need to
record ~10^10 B/sec of data and store it somewhere for later retrieval. As for
network access, 10^10 B/sec is > 10^3 times the capacity of an 802.11g link
running full out.

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Received on Sun Dec 31 23:17:11 2006

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