Absolutely Secure Voting System

From: Ken Pugh <kpughmisc_at_pughkilleen_dot_com>
Date: Tue Dec 14 2004 - 22:55:09 CST

***** Absolutely Secure Voting System (Written only with tongue firmly
in cheek)

The federal government has created an absolutely secure voting system. It
insures that all eligible voters will not be denied the opportunity to cast
a ballot and no voter will be able to cast more than one vote.

Every eligible voter is on the federal voter registration database. Each
voter notifies the agency in charge of this database when they move. This
database is used to create the state databases, which then is used to
create the election district databases. Thus any voter can only be
registered in exactly one place. This provides the authorization
mechanism for voting.

In order to provide a foolproof authentication scheme, every voter provides
the database a sample of their DNA. At the time of submission, the
identity of the voter is confirmed, so that the DNA can be used as a
confirmed identifier. This sample is used only to authenticate the voter,
not for any other nefarious purposes. The database checks for any
duplicate DNA signatures and requires additional identification in those
instances (a thumb print).

When a voter comes into vote, they provide a small saliva sample in front
of the registration workers. The sample is analyzed and matched against
the voter registration database. If the voter has attempted to vote twice,
they are immediately charged with voter fraud and taken away. (If there
were duplicate DNA signatures, the voter is asked for a thumbprint).

The voter is then given a ballot. They vote, place the ballot into an
envelope, seal it, and then give it a kiss. The vote counting procedure
is straightforward. The saliva from the kiss is analyzed and matched to
the voter database. If the voter did not sign-in or there are two
envelopes with the same DNA, the voter is charged with vote fraud. Then
the envelope is placed in another basket, opened, and the votes counted. At
the end of the process, if the voter sign-in has a record for a voter and
no matching envelope was found in the cast ballots, an investigation is
launched. The voter is contacted and can optionally cast another ballot.

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Received on Fri Dec 31 23:17:14 2004

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