Re: Ballot Validation and voting machine initializtion

From: Keith Copenhagen <K_at_copetech_dot_com>
Date: Tue Dec 14 2004 - 10:38:41 CST

I claim there is a natural conflict between the "open" in OVC and
that is only readable by a machine.

We are talking about an equally or more important data flow parallel to
the ballot
which is the "voter qualified to cast" information.

If you are specifying a mag card (barcode/intelligent token) why not have a
human readable voter registration paper-card that is "shown" to a camera
camera and
OCR'd to determine the ballot to provide.

The voter reg card could be printed on demand by the sign-in station and
collected synchronous with the ballot. The reg card could be pre-printed
or be the
provisional ballot envelop.


On Tue, 14 Dec 2004 12:57:46 +0000, <> wrote:

> I have an innate suspicion of using a smart card that contains the voter
> ID. It could be used to undermine the secret ballot.
> --
> Kurt
> This email sent using 100%
> recycled electrons.
> -------------- Original message from Jim March <>:
> --------------
>> Ed Kennedy wrote:
>> > Hello Ken:
>> >
>> > I have come to believe that we do need intelligent tokens to initiate
>> > voting machines (surprise Arthur!). The purpose of these tokens woud
>> > be several fold.
>> >
>> > The biggest issue is how does one initialize a voting machine for each
>> > voter. Diebold and I suspect others handled this by using an
>> > intelligent token that the voter inserted into the machine to start it
>> > up for each voter. I know we went round and round about that last
>> > winter and spring and came with at least 5 different methods that had
>> > issues around each one. Since I've been a poll worker I've changed my
>> > mind.
>> >
>> > To handle primary elections where voters must vote by party. They
>> > would declare their party preference to the poll worker at the index
>> > who would generate the proper token.
>> Ummm...couple comments here.
>> In the voter registration data collected by the SecState's office, party
>> affiliation is listed. They can output Comma Separated Values data to
>> the county, which your system then imports.
>> The volume of data is small enough that every voting machine can have
>> the whole set. That means there's really no problem at all with people
>> voting at ANY precinct(!) because once they identify themselves to the
>> system, it "knows" where they live and what party they are, and can
>> present the ballot accordingly.
>> The only remaining issue is "how do they identify themselves"?
>> Avante's answer is a sixteen digit alphanumeric code for each voter.
>> They use the first eight digits to ID the human, the next eight to ID
>> the ballot style used (I think two or three of those digits is a county
>> ID unique in the nation). This code is on a "dumb card" that's very
>> tough and flexible. Once ANY of the systems records a voter with that
>> number as having voted at a specific time, when the totals are all piled
>> up, any duplicates result in a flag and all subsequent after the first
>> get tossed...copying an ID card doesn't allow fraud.
>> But...we should remember that Avante was using such cards to ID people
>> coming in and out of buildings and trade shows. Their voting system was
>> originally an attempt to find a new use for the cards . So they
>> were biased towards using said cards and hence we can't assume that's
>> the only way to skin this cat.
>> However. They did prove that a "dumb token" can be used to ID voters.
>> And in their scheme, inserting the card cannot insert extranous data or
>> program files. In the Diebold touchscreens, the "smart cards" have 128k
>> RAM on board of which only 4k - 8k is needed for "voter ID" - the rest
>> is full of God only knows what. I cannot recommend highly enough y'all
>> do NOT do like that, or you'll have me outside your office doors
>> protesting yer arses :).
>> Jim
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Keith Copenhagen
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Received on Fri Dec 31 23:17:13 2004

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