Re: Ballot Validation

From: Ed Kennedy <ekennedyx_at_yahoo_dot_com>
Date: Sat Dec 11 2004 - 21:36:34 CST

Hello Ken:

Pre-voting?, voting validators?, sounds a little more complicated than it
should be. I've been a poll worker and I can tell you that complicated =
misunderstanding = disenfranchisement and incorrect votes. I expect the
scanable ballot to be printed up on the spot after the voter tells the
Markamatic that they are done voting. Yes, special paper might be a good
idea. As an aside, to make it reliably through a scanner, even once, it's
going to have to be card stock or similar. I don't know about other States,
but we had 15 races and 25 propositions this November which ended up being
printed on both sides of one piece of legal size paper.

And of course, Doug hits the nail on the head about applying good sense when
working through voting problems.

Thanks, Ed Kennedy

===========================

Douglas W. Jones wrote:
> On Dec 11, 2004, at 1:21 PM, Ken Pugh wrote:
>
>> It appears that there are two basic approaches to electronic voting
>> system.
>>
>> 1.) The printed ballot is supreme.
>> Ballot may be filled in manually
>> Ballot may be filled in by computer
>> Ballot is tallied by scanner.
>>
>> 2.) The printed ballot is a receipt
>> Ballot is filled in and tabulated on the computer
>> Printed ballot is used for verification
>
> There's another position that I think is superior to these two:
>
> The electronic record and the printed record are both viewed as
> fallible and subject to subversion. A hacker can hack into a
> computer and corrupt data. A counterfeiter can print up counterfeit
> ballots and swap them for the real ones. We can adopt technical
> means to defend against either attack, but if we adopt laws that
> say:
>
> In the event of a disagreement, the paper dominates.
>
> Then all you need is a good counterfeiter, while if your rules say
>
> In the event of a disagreement, the electronic copy dominates.
>
> Then, all you need is a good hacker. The rule I would prefer to
> see says:
>
> In the event of a disagreement, an investigation must be initiated
> in order to determine which copy is most likely to be correct...
>
> The rules could go on at length about what other things to
> examine, such as pollbooks, event logs, exit polls, and other
> evidence that could serve to corraborate one or the other copy.
>
> Doug Jones
> jones@cs.uiowa.edu
>
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Received on Fri Dec 31 23:17:10 2004

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