Re: Interesting, But What About the Election-Day Virus?

From: Rick Gideon <rick_at_openvoting_dot_org>
Date: Thu Dec 09 2004 - 16:59:03 CST

Opening up external ports that could be utilized by an un-authorized
person is a bad idea, as is networking.

Overall, when you're producing a paper ballot as the vote of record,
the software should only need to be audited once to ensure it is the
correct version before the polls open and then seal the machine, and once again
at the end of the night after the polls have closed to ensure nothing has changed.

On Thu, 9 Dec 2004, Robert Rapplean wrote:

> Rick Gideon wrote:
>
> >I believe that the best thing to do is to stray from having any externally
> >accesable I/O ports such as a USB port that could be used maliciously by
> >someone. Need the device(s) which to register votes and that is all.
> >
> >The machines also should be stand-alone and not networked at all.
> >
> >
> So you're suggesting that our voting machines should be unauditable
> where they sit in the voting booths, or that we should trust them to be
> self-auditing?
>
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Received on Fri Dec 31 23:17:09 2004

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