Re: About the Voter-verified community

From: laird popkin <lairdp_at_gmail_dot_com>
Date: Tue Dec 07 2004 - 16:43:46 CST

Cool. Can we turn this into a more fleshed our proposal for consideration?

- LP

On Tue, 7 Dec 2004 14:28:20 -0800 (PST), Edmund R. Kennedy
<ekennedyx@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> Hello Arthur:
>
> While I think my sentiment is already clear, I don't actually see any
> conflict between the 'Dechert' system and the ballot marker (the
> Markamatic?, the Markatron?) as long as it is viewed as one of a number of
> intermediate step towards a fully integrated system. I believe we were
> talking about taking a longer term view towards developing the system so
> this wouldn't be contradictory to focus on this sub-component. As it is,
> North Carolina, Colorado, California and Utah are begging us for such a
> thing, and want it yesterday. We've got to get off the dime here!
>
> Thanks, Ed Kennedy
>
>
>
> Arthur Keller <arthur@kellers.org> wrote:
>
>
> This message represents the sentiment of many in the "voter-verified"
> community. Do we want to join the bandwagon and combine our voice
> with theirs (and develop an open source alternative for it) or do we
> want to continue with the Dechert architecture (I'm not calling it
> the OVC architecture, because Doug Jones refers to "open voting
> systems" in the plural, and to give Alan credit for originating it)?
> Open source is a means towards the goal of reliable, secure,
> trustworthy voting systems. I think we should consider how best to
> deal with the HAVA deadlines and the timelines for meeting these
> deadlines, and consider how our work fits within the context of the
> larger movement.
>
> Best regards,
> Arthur
>
> >Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2004 14:06:52 -0700
> >From: "Joe Pezzillo"
> >To: "Cvv-Discuss@Coloradovote! r. Net"
> >Cc: "Arthur Keller" , "David Aragon" ,
> > "Pete Klammer" ,
> > "Barbara Simons"
>
>
> >Subject: Re: Hand Recounts of votes recorded on DREs
> >
> >
> >Not sure about the leading "A", but VVPAT means: Voter Verified
> >Paper Audit Trail
> >
> >In Boulder (and on most of the national lists I've seen, as well),
> >many folks are specific about using the similar acronym VVPB for a
> >paper ballot instead of just an "audit trail"
> >
> >I'm sure there is discussion in the archives or on the website about
> >the importance of this distinction, at least in Colorado where we
> >have the problematic "method of recount" law.
> >
> >In general, the dozens of Boulder citizens who researched this last
> >year reached consensus around asking specifically for a paper ballot
> >to be the official reco! rd of the voter's intent, instead of creating
>
>
> >a possibly ambiguous situation in which there could be "two" ballots
> >(the DRE record and the audit trail "receipt") and one might have to
> >fight in court for the paper to have primacy.
> >
> >Then, if paper is going to be the official record, there is no
> >reason to use the term Audit Trail, nor to have the artifact be
> >difficult to hand count (a la an ATM or gas pump type print out), so
> >instead, let's ask for what we want: a paper ballot.
> >
> >The "compromise" position was to propose using "vote marking"
> >machines (and specifically not vote recording devices of any kind)
> >that could offer all the accessibility, language, and ballot style
> >benefits of a tablet DRE, but instead, the device creates uniform
> >marks on "regular" ballots to be hand counted and/or optically
> >scanned. The same device could offer audible read-back of a cast
> >bal! lot for verification. I've heard these devices now called
>
>
> >"hybrids."
> >
> >In any event, part of the importance of these terms is that the
> >"audit trail" term has been used against voter verification and
> >trustworthy election advocates by people such as Colorado's
> >Secretary of State, who ignore the request for a paper ballot by
> >saying that "adding an audit trail is too complicated" (or too
> >expensive, or too difficult for elections judges to manage, etc.) So
> >instead of talking about the benefits of paper ballots, the
> >discussion is lost on modifications to DREs that we don't want to
> >begin with. There is also the valid concern that the "audit trail"
> >will provide a false sense of security if not treated (that is,
> >counted) like an official ballot; imagine a majority of voters
> >leaving a polling place having voted "Yes" on an issue, but the
> >final DRE total says "No" and everyone ! just assumes the machine
> >total must be correct because they saw the paper slip, even though
> >the paper slips were not tallied as part of the final total. Of
> >course a physical audit of the "slips" might catch such an error,
> >but in places where such an audit is not currently automatically
> >provided for by law (such as Colorado), there's no guarantee that
> >the audit would occur, and if the slips differ from the DRE, what's
> >the likelihood that the legal basis for using them will be
> >challenged if they are not "official" ballots to begin with?
> >
> >We haven't been asking for an audit trail in Colorado, we've been
> >asking for paper ballots, and we recommend the same to voters across
> >the nation.
> >
> >Paper Ballots are certainly what I'm wishing for, and I'm not afraid
> >of wishing for them, either!
> >
> >Joe
> >
> >Joe Pezzillo, Citizen Activist
> >Boulder, Colorado USA
> >jpezzillo@qwest.net
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >On Dec 7, 2004, at 1:32 PM, Paul E Condon wrote:
> >
> >>On Tue, Dec 07, 2004 at 12:18:10AM -0800, Arthur Keller wrote:
> >>>At 11:14 PM -0800 12/6/04, David Aragon wrote:
> >>>>Barbara Simons wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>>A "hand recount" of paperless DRE votes should come up with
> >>>>>the same tally that the DRE originally produced, unless the
> >>>>>DREs are really really broken.
> >>>>
> >>>>Clearly it can't detect errors in the recording of votes to
> >>>>produce the DRE output. But it can detect errors in the
> >>>>tallying of those outputs downstream of the DRE's -- which is
> >>>>certainly an area of concern and potential source of errors.
> >>>
> >>>It can also detect errors in the tallying of votes WITHIN the DREs.
> >>>
> >>>>So it's not pointless. But neither is it the end-to-end
> >>>>audit function that "hand recount", with its connotations
> >>>>of painstaking meticulousness, has formerly meant.
> >>>
> >>>Certainly it is better to have an AVVPAT for each DRE. But let hand
> >>>recounts of DREs go forward with the painstaking auditing process if
> >>>there's a chance it's not pointless. We don't want election
> >>>officials deliberately avoiding a great deal of effort by choosing
> >>>DREs without AVVPATs. Be careful what you wish for, you just might
> >>>get it.
> >>
> >>Please excuse a question whose answer is obvious to most everyone
> >>on this list: What does AVVPAT stand for?
> >>
> >>--
> >>Paul E Condon
> >>pecondon@mesanetworks.net
>
>
> --
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA 94303-4507
> tel +1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
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>
> --
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>
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-- 
- Laird Popkin, cell: 917/453-0700
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Received on Fri Dec 31 23:17:06 2004

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