Re: Critical analysis of VoteHere

From: Arthur Keller <arthur_at_kellers_dot_org>
Date: Sun Dec 14 2003 - 10:21:09 CST

At 9:09 AM -0700 12/14/03, charlie strauss wrote:
>>Another problem with the scheme is that someone can demand your
>>receipt and using that find out exactly how you voted the same way
>>that you do.
>No this would not work. The mapping of names-to-numbers changes for
>every ballot, that's the cleverness of their scheme but it
>introduces a whole new problem of how you assure that the mapping
>you are shown does not get switched. The Votehere descritpion of
>how this is handled gets quite elaborate and I'm not perfectly
>certain it succeeds. Any time someone tells you in detail about the
>exponents in their crytoscheme before they give you the basic flow
>of the method you should hang onto your wallet.

The same way that *you* verify your ballot is the same way that
someone else with your receipt can find out how you voted.

>>That's the benefit of a voter-verified *ballot* that has to be
>>handed in for it to count. The voter can verify it is correct, and
>>the voter doesn't walk away with any receipt that displays the vote.
>The votehere scheme also appears to be a voter verifeable system as
>well. But it uses receipts not ballots. and the receipt does not
>display the votes that any ordinary person can read. Paper ballot
>schemes use well understood procedural methods for gaurenteeing that
>no one changes the ballots. the vote here scheme introduces a
>different less familiar procedural channel to maintain the mapping
>between your receipt and the vote. Is this other method trustable
>is the essential question being asked here.

A paper ballot based system has a well-understood process for
recount. The votehere scheme apparently requires an elaborate
process for recount, and that process is essentially the same as the
original counting process. Ideally, there should be multiple
counting (tabulation) processes that can be crosschecked for
validation. It's not at all clear that this is the case for
VoteHere. But our approach can crosscheck the electronic ballot
against the paper ballot, and the paper ballot can be optically
scanned for the barcode and counted by reading the printing on the

Best regards,

Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA  94303-4507
tel +1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
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Received on Wed Dec 31 23:17:11 2003

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