Re: Critical analysis of VoteHere

From: Dennis <dpaull_at_svpal_dot_org>
Date: Sat Dec 13 2003 - 18:03:51 CST

Hi Alan et al,

What if the coercer asks you for your ballot nnumber so he/she can
check it out personally? The voter would have to find someone else's
ballot who voted the way the coercer wanted and copied down the ballot
number. That might be tough. Would voters be able to browse through the

If so, it would provide a way for politicos to analyze the ballots by
cross referencing multiple races in ways never available previously. Would
this be good or bad?


At 12:56 PM 12/13/2003 -0800, you wrote:
>> If you really really want the active audit thing, here's another idea to
>> add. I said that it would be easy to create an authentic looking
>> counterfeit ballot. But what if you could produce one at the polling
>Thinking more about this ..... I like this idea so much I think I want to
>add it to the proposed OVC system.
>Let's say it's like this:
>The voter prints only their own single ballot in the voting booth (no copy).
>After the polls close the ballot reconciliation procedure is run and the
>files are transmitted to the county HQ electronically. The paper ballots
>are sealed in a box and securely removed in preparation for transfer. At
>this point (maybe 15 - 20 minutes after the polls close), all of the voting
>machines get copies of all of the ballot images (xml files). Anyone can
>then go into the voting booth and browse all of the ballot images and print
>which ever one(s) they want. If they've made a note of their own ballot
>they can print a copy of that and/or they could print others.
>The county will post the xml files on the Internet so you can go home and
>see a copy of your ballot there. But you could also have a paper copy of
>another ballot if you feel you need one to fake out a potential coercer.
>What do you think of this proposal?
>Alan D.
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Received on Wed Dec 31 23:17:10 2003

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