Re: Critical analysis of VoteHere

From: charlie strauss <cems_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Sat Dec 13 2003 - 17:25:37 CST

Somehow I'm only seeing one side of this e-mail conversation (only
Alan's e-mails are coming through).

Anyhow there's some clever thoughts in here. marking your own ballot
might not solve the issue since you might be told what to mark it with.
  My own thought on how to get around the coercion/voting buying issue
is simply to allow the voters to create fake, but real looking,
receipts, perhaps on a demo machine in the lobby.

But I'd like to get off the receipt issue here for moment to re-ask the
original question.

The goal is to have voter verified ballots. And Dave Mertz pointed
out Issues like voter's being able to check for themsleves that their
ballot was counted outside the poll is nice but not essential.
Receipts are not essential. But the votehere system uses receipts in a
clever way to possibly create voter verified electronic ballots. These
other features are just cool side effects not the main point.

So the question is does Votehere actually create voter verifiable
electronic ballots or not. It seems to come down to an incredibly
tricky scheme to validate the code mapping numbers to names for each
ballot. I cant say their scheme is foolproof.

On Dec 13, 2003, at 1:56 PM, Alan Dechert wrote:

>> If you really really want the active audit thing, here's another idea
>> to
>> add. I said that it would be easy to create an authentic looking
>> counterfeit ballot. But what if you could produce one at the polling
> place?
>>
> Thinking more about this ..... I like this idea so much I think I want
> to
> add it to the proposed OVC system.
>
> Let's say it's like this:
>
> The voter prints only their own single ballot in the voting booth (no
> copy).
> After the polls close the ballot reconciliation procedure is run and
> the
> files are transmitted to the county HQ electronically. The paper
> ballots
> are sealed in a box and securely removed in preparation for transfer.
> At
> this point (maybe 15 - 20 minutes after the polls close), all of the
> voting
> machines get copies of all of the ballot images (xml files). Anyone
> can
> then go into the voting booth and browse all of the ballot images and
> print
> which ever one(s) they want. If they've made a note of their own
> ballot
> they can print a copy of that and/or they could print others.
>
> The county will post the xml files on the Internet so you can go home
> and
> see a copy of your ballot there. But you could also have a paper copy
> of
> another ballot if you feel you need one to fake out a potential
> coercer.
>
> What do you think of this proposal?
>
> Alan D.
>
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Received on Wed Dec 31 23:17:10 2003

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