Re: Critical analysis of VoteHere

From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Sat Dec 13 2003 - 14:39:06 CST

Again, a little more
> To add a little to what I've said here.... If we do decide to try to
> audit" personal vote proving capabilities to the system, I have thought
> about how it might be done.
If you really really want the active audit thing, here's another idea to
add. I said that it would be easy to create an authentic looking
counterfeit ballot. But what if you could produce one at the polling place?

Let's say that as soon as the polls close and the ballot reconciliation
procedure is run, we load one of the voting machines with the ballot images
and allow anyone to go there to produce a fake "souvenir" ballot. You make
a selection that you want to appear on your fake, and it prints an exact
copy of a ballot that was actually cast that has your counter selection.
You can print one with a combination of selections with the limitation that
such a combination acually exists on a ballot. You could also print a
couple of different fakes to get copies with selections you want that might
not all exist on any single ballot.

After the ballot images (xml files) are transmitted to the county HQ, they
get posted to the Internet for viewing. You know which one is really yours,
but you also have a fake that you could show to Wade if he demands to see
your ballot and wants to look on the Internet to verify that it is an
authentic ballot. You are showing him a ballot that is an exact copy of an
authentic ballot -- it just doesn't happen to be yours. Wade has no way of
knowing even if he stakes out the polling place to see if you go there to
print a fake because you could have someone else do it for you.

Alan D.

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Received on Wed Dec 31 23:17:10 2003

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