Re: OVC-discuss Digest, Vol 22, Issue 24

From: Jerry Lobdill <lobdillj_at_charter_dot_net>
Date: Tue Aug 22 2006 - 14:46:57 CDT

Talk about a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde!

I have posted the entirety of email interchanges between me and Ms.
Dopp at
Please download and compare Kathy's demeanor and language with her
most recent post to this list below.

She writes below:
I see that Jerry has taken the clustering approach to adjusting for
precinct-size variation that I first suggested to him in a quick
sentence in my email response to him re. two possible ways that came
immediately to my mind for ways that precinct-size variation can be
adjusted for.

This statement is not a mistake. It is a deliberate lie, and is
completely in character for Kathy. She never suggested any such thing
to me. Quite the contrary.

I might add that when she first contacted Howard Stanislevic her
first move was to accuse him of plagiarism. Typical Dopp!

Best regards,

Jerry Lobdill

At 02:00 PM 8/22/2006, you wrote:
>From: "Kathy Dopp" <>
>Precedence: list
>MIME-Version: 1.0
>Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2006 14:03:45 -0600
>Reply-To:, Open Voting Consortium discussion list
> <>
>Message-ID: <>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] Effect of Precinct Size Variation on Audits
>Message: 1
>On 8/21/06,
><> wrote:
>>Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2006 20:30:51 -0500
>>From: Jerry Lobdill <>
>>Subject: Re: [OVC-discuss] Effect of Precinct Size Variation on Audits
>>Let's first be clear. The only data that Kathy has from Tarrant
>>County TX is that which I have also published
>>at This
>>data is the result of processing and compressing a lot of the
>>original detailed data from a real election. It is very high level
>>summary data. If Kathy wants to use it that's fine,
>Nice concise paper on audits by Jerry. It is always very good to
>bring more attention to this subject.
>FYI, Although Jerry's data was very helpful for testing our method of
>adjusting audit amounts for precinct-size variations, we are not
>including it in our soon to be released paper. We'll be using some
>Ohio data instead because we obtained more detailed data so we knew
>exactly if we were using total ballots cast versus total votes, etc.
>Thank you for providing Jerry as the Tarrant County data was very
>helpful for developing our method of adjusting for precinct-size
>>Since she seems to be about to publish something different from what
>>she's been selling up to now that may involve the data I have
>Jerry is selling a mischaracterization of "what she's been selling" all along.
>The very first time Jerry, in email, mentioned the possible effects of
>precinct-size variation on the ability to subvert audits (by targeting
>vote miscount to the largest precincts), I immediately (within
>seconds) emailed Jerry to inform him that that is easy to adjust the
>calculations of audit size for precinct size variation but is only
>needed for audits of precinct optical scan count audits and not for
>DRE machine count audits. Then I suggested two ways to possibly do it
>that came to mind, but as it turned out I did not use either of those
>first thoughts of mine. Nothing has changed about my position, but,
>as with any research, it evolves and improves over time.
>Jerry apparently disagrees (perhaps still?) with my gut analysis
>(above) and that is his right. I also made a temporary minor
>programming error in my precinct-size-variation adjustments that had a
>big effect which I discovered myself and corrected and let everyone
>know about on this list.
>>mentioned above, and considering her behavior in the recent past, I
>>have decided to publish my paper on mandatory election audit design
>>now. I have sent it to a large number of researchers working in the
>>field of audit design and election integrity assurance. Some of you
>>may have received it directly from me today. If not, and you'd like
>>to have your own copy of it you may download a pdf file of it at
>I see that Jerry's paper uses the same probability formulas that NEDA
>publicly recommended for calculating audits in June, 2005 and that is
>great. The more various works confirm each other's methods, the
>>corruption. The metrics permit the segregation of polling places into
>>two clusters, one of high probability of potential irregularity, and
>>one of lower probability.
>I see that Jerry has taken the clustering approach to adjusting for
>precinct-size variation that I first suggested to him in a quick
>sentence in my email response to him re. two possible ways that came
>immediately to my mind for ways that precinct-size variation can be
>adjusted for. Although I did not end up taking this approach
>myself, it seems like a fine approach (although I've not studied it in
>depth like Jerry has)
>I am glad that Jerry added another alternative to the public domain,
>like the recent paper by O'Dell, Simon, Mitteldorf, and Freeman on why
>HR550 would not succeed in detecting outcome-altering vote miscount.
>It is important for election integrity activists not to nitpick about
>details at this point in time.
>One reason that NEDA was able to persuade the Carter-Baker Election
>Reform Commission Director, Robert Pastor, to recommend audits (the
>Carter-Baker was the first group after NEDA to recommend election
>audits, and the US GAO was the second, both of whom NEDA had
>communication with on this issue of election audits), is because the
>paper we released was short, sweet and simple and made it all sound
>Jerry's paper adds something valuable to the discussion and is nice
>and brief. I have no problem with Jerry's method, although I've not
>studied it in depth.
>Howard Stanislevic of VoteTrustUSA also publicly released a method
>that (although partially trial and error like my July 16, 17 paper)
>that is virtually identical to the method that Frank and I have been
>working on implementing since July (but I initially made a tiny
>programming error that had huge effect). We will be publicly
>releasing it soon, and the NEW thing about it will be a direct
>solution to the problem of calculating vote count audit sample sizes.
>Unfortunately the soon-to-be-released paper by Frank and I is not so
>short and sweet, although it suggests a slightly easier (IMO) method
>of adjusting for precinct-size variation, plus a direct method to
>calculate the audit sample size.
>Thank you for your work on this Jerry.
>>Clustering the polling places allows a two tiered audit. The first
>>tier is small sample of polling places from the small high suspicion
>>cluster. The second tier is a larger sample from the larger cluster
>>with lower suspicion. There is a 95% probability of detecting
>>irregularity for each cluster. If the high suspicion cluster yields
>>evidence of corruption the audit need go no further, and a complete
>>hand recount would be ordered. In any case, the audit requires
>>perhaps less than 5 polling place recounts or as many as 32 depending
>>on whether and when an irregularity is discovered. The total number
>>of polling places was 211, serving 634 precincts.
>> Jerry Lobdill

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Received on Thu Aug 31 23:17:08 2006

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