Re: Sneak Preview - Average US County - Election Integrity Vote Count Audit Results

From: Jerry Lobdill <lobdillj_at_charter_dot_net>
Date: Thu Aug 10 2006 - 16:34:16 CDT

On Wed. 9 Aug 2006 at 21:26:09 Kathy Dopp wrote:

"Jerry Lobdill provided some sample data from Tarrant County which has
large variation in precinct sizes that produces a drop of 2.5% in the
probability of detecting outcome altering miscount (from 95% to 92.5%)
in a tiny range of small candidate margins if miscounts are thusly
targeted to the fewest largest precincts. So Frank and I added an
adjustment that uses the largest precinct sizes and the total number
of ballots cast in any county to ensure that precinct count audits
probabilities still never drop even a little below the desired
probability."

***************
Let's DO have some honesty here, Kathy!

When, on 7/29/06, I sent you the only data from Tarrant County that I
have ever sent you, the data I sent was a frequency distribution plot
of vote count sizes from Tarrant County and the table from which it
was plotted. ( See
http://www.myimagehosting.com/pic.php?u=778Ke5d2&i=41167) I did this
in the context of an extended email exchange with you in which you
had been increasingly impatient and inappropriately defensive--not to
mention nasty. It was because of a total break down of communication
with you that I posted my message about NEDA going down a primrose
path to this list.

I see that you have been busy trying to slither around and alter your
position on how to do audits so that you can claim that you were
always considering the possibility that vote count size variation is
important. Your paper,
"How Can Independent Paper Audits Detect and Correct Vote Miscounts",
which carries your date of 7/29/2006 available at
http://www.myimagehosting.com/pic.php?u=778Ke5d2&i=41168 makes no
mention whatever of the distribution of vote count sizes. Nor do any
of your papers carrying a previous date make such a claim. This has
been my theme song all along.

Please explain how you and Frank Stenger have used the data I sent
you (Download it at the URL given above.) to come up with your new
paper. Explain how you used that data to conclude that the
distribution caused a "2.5% drop in the probability of detecting
outcome altering miscount (from 95% to 92.5%) in a tiny range of
small candidate margins if miscounts are thusly targeted to the
fewest largest precincts." Your new paper does not say how you
arrived at that result. Nor does it mention anything about the effect
of vote count size distribution. Nor does it describe the
"adjustment that uses the largest precinct sizes and the total number
of ballots cast in any county" that you say that you and Frank
added. This is the very first time that I have heard you say that
this might be important. I suppose that is progress.

The fact is that you have consistently claimed in emails to me that
the only inputs your technique requires are (1) the number of vote
counts in the county, (2) the number of hypothetical corrupted vote
counts, (3) the desired probability of detecting corruption, and that
with these inputs you calculate what you have labeled in the above
referenced document as "Exact Probabilities of Finding One or More
Corrupt Counts". Exact probabilities? How exact? What if the actual
number of corrupted precincts (which we do not know in any situation)
is different from what you used to calculate your "exact
probability"? In what sense is it exact?

As soon as Arthur Keller reports back on the evaluation of my paper
and whatever you submitted I will offer mine as a download to this
group. I hope you will do the same.

Jerry Lobdill

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Received on Thu Aug 31 23:17:06 2006

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