Lecture Questions Security Level of Electronic Voting

From: Arthur Keller <arthur_at_kellers_dot_org>
Date: Fri Aug 20 2004 - 15:03:45 CDT

"Lecture Questions Security Level of Electronic Voting"
  Chicago Daily Herald (08/19/04); Pierce, Gala M.

  Rice University computer science assistant professor Dan Wallach
detailed flaws in electronic voting at a Fermilab Colloquium lecture
in Batavia, Ill., on Aug. 18. He was confident that it is
"technically feasible" for a person or group of people to rig an
election using e-voting systems, and do so without leaving any
evidence. Wallach argued that direct recording electronic machines
cannot accurately catch the intent of the voter. He pointed out that
voting machine companies claim their products are reliable and
secure, yet they do not permit independent parties to certify their
systems, nor do the systems furnish paper ballots so that vote counts
can be double-checked. Former Naperville League of Women Voters
President Stephanie Hughes expressed her worries during a
question-and-answer session at the colloquium. "We feel in this area,
the issue is not just with the machines or the individual voter, but
what goes on with the tabulation," she noted. "There is so much
secrecy about the technicality on that level." Wallach was one of
four researchers who published a paper on voting machine supplier
Diebold, whose voting system source code was recently disclosed
online. The researchers found Diebold's source code susceptible to
network threats and only meeting minimal security standards.
http://www.dailyherald.com/search/main_story.asp?intid=3821843 has full article

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Received on Tue Aug 31 23:17:17 2004

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