Re: FYI - [IP] How They Could Steal the Election This Time and response

From: Barbara Simons <simons_at_acm_dot_org>
Date: Tue Aug 03 2004 - 11:48:53 CDT

Shamos knows no shame. For what it's worth, he was also on the wrong side
of the issue with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act - defending Hollywood
and the record industry. Aside from money he gets as an expert witness in
court cases (both voting and DMCA), I don't know why he does this. But,
maybe the money is more than an aside.
Regards,
Barbara

On 8/1/04 21:04, "Karl Auerbach" <karl@cavebear.com> wrote:

>
> This was on Dave Farber's IP list.
>
> One of my thoughts was "shame on Shamos".
>
> --karl--
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> Date: Sun, 1 Aug 2004 19:29:25 -0400
> From: David Farber <dave@farber.net>
> To: Ip <ip@v2.listbox.com>
> Subject: [IP] How They Could Steal the Election This Time and response
>
>
> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah@shipwright.com>
> Date: July 31, 2004 4:03:41 PM EDT
> To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
> Subject: How They Could Steal the Election This Time
>
> <http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20040816&s=dugger>
>
> Click here to return to the browser-optimized version of this page.
>
> This article can be found on the web at
> http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040816&s=dugger
>
> How They Could Steal the Election This Time
>
> by RONNIE DUGGER
>
> [from the August 16, 2004 issue]
>
>
> AND from Mike Shamos who was quoted in the article
>
> "I sent the following to The Nation today:"
>
> To the Editor:
>
> Ronnie Dugger's article ("How They Could Steal The Election This Time," Aug.
> 16) contains an error in its very first sentence and things only go downhill
> from there. He claims that voting system vendors could program the machines
> "to invisibly falsify the outcomes." There is no basis at all for asserting,
> or even believing, that such a thing is possible. It is pure science fiction
> to dream that it can be done "invisibly." Machines are tested, and if
> tampering has occurred it can be found. If the machines have been altered,
> then forensic examination can detect the alteration. He fails to mention that
> DRE machines have been used in the United States for over 25 years without a
> single verified incident in which the outcome of any election was altered
> through tampering.
>
> Later, Mr. Dugger misquotes me as having said that "computerized vote-counting
> is highly vulnerable to fraud." I wrote many years ago, and still believe,
> that punched-card voting, not DRE voting, was vulnerable to fraud.
>
> His most basic error, however, is in urging that paper systems are safer than
> electronic ones. Since 1852, the New York Times has published over 4000
> articles on paper ballot fraud in the United States. That works out to about
> one article every 12 days for the past 152 years. Paper is not safe. It may
> be familiar, but it is the principal tool of election fraud in this country
> and
> always has been. The answer is not to return to paper but to implement
> safeguards to assure the public that the sorts of machinations Mr. Dugger
> imagines are not possible in practice.
> ________________________________________________________________________
> __________
> Michael I. Shamos
> Distinguished Career Professor, Language Technologies Institute
> Director, Universal Library
> Co-Director, Electronic Commerce degree program
> 4515 Newell-Simon Hall, Carnegie Mellon University
> Pittsburgh, PA 15213
> 412-268-8193 (office phone) 412-268-6298 (office fax) 412-681-8398 (home
> phone)
> Home page: http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/people/faculty/mshamos
>
> -------------------------------------
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Received on Tue Aug 31 23:17:02 2004

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