Re: WHAT THE DEMO WILL DEMONSTRATE -- V.001

From: Alan Dechert <adechert_at_earthlink_dot_net>
Date: Sun Aug 24 2003 - 12:39:38 CDT

Matteo,

> Hi Alan,
>
> here are the only things I could comment...
>
> AD> 6. ELECTRONIC SYSTEM THAT CAN RENDER LARGER TYPE ON SCREEN
>
> [snip]
> AD> The re-sized on-screen ballot will have to be on multiple pages
> AD> and we'll provide a navigation button
> AD> (actually 3 buttons <- prev - return to normal - next->).
> AD> We will only provide 2 sizes in the demo: nomal and large
> AD> (probably twice the size).
>
> As long as there could be more pages even on "small size fonts" (it
> depends on the number of races and candidates) I won't say that the
> prev and next button are present only on the "large size fonts".
>
Thanks very much for writing, Matteo. You bring up several important
points.

The normal sized ballot represented here does not need prev and next button
because the whole ballot fits on one page.
http://home.earthlink.net/~adechert/ballot-mockup3.gif

Doug Jones may be able to provide better insight as to what "normal sized"
means.

> Real production system will have many more issue on this point, but we
> are not talking about this here.
>
Correct. In the real production system we will codify all the rules for
ballot construction. This is a massive undertaking, partly because
computer voting is still fairly new and the rules we need to codify are not
really known at this point.

> AD> 7. ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE FOR THE BLIND THAT INCLUDES A PAPER
> AD> PRINTOUT BUT WILL NOT COMPROMISE SECRECY AND STILL PROVIDE VOTER
> AD> VERIFICATION
>
> I guess the demo will only print the bar-code or do you wish to
> realize the full software for the headphones?
>
Absolutely, we need to have the headphones. This part of the demo (#7) may
be the most important thing we have to do. The notion that computer voting
with a printout will compromise the blind voter's right to a secret ballot
is a major charge against the voter-verified paper trail. We have to make a
strong counter to this.

Here is an example of the argument:
http://www.civilrights.org/issues/voting/details.cfm?id=14878

Note where they say, "Mandating Voter-Verified Paper Trails Could Deny
Voters With Disabilities the Right to Cast a Secret Ballot."

Actually, I suppose they are right, strictly speaking, since they say "Could
Deny," not "Will Deny." If it's not done right, it could cause them to
reveal their ballot. We have to demonstrate that right way to do this.

> AD> 11. GRAPHICALLY BEAUTIFUL ON-SCREEN BALLOT
>
> AD> The on-screen ballot should be very pleasant to the eye. The tiles
> AD> for each contest should be clearly separated utilizing an
> AD> attractive color scheme.
> AD> We also need to test some with a color-blind user to make sure the
> AD> colors provide acceptable shading differences for them.
>
> Better rely on studies about colour-blind people. Testing it with a
> real colour-blind user is okay, but to choose the right colours I
> guess that the available studies are a better choice.
>
Good point. Probably we won't have time to do much testing with color-blind
users. We should make use of the work that has already been done in this
area.

> AD> 13. WRITE-IN VOTING WITH ELECTRONIC SYSTEM
>
> AD> Selecting "Write-in" will bring up an on-screen typewriter. A
> AD> QWERTY layout will appear on the top half of the screen (three
> AD> rows plus space bar below).
> [snip]
>
> This keyboard will hide something of the on-screen ballot: what will
> it hide?
>
I am thinking that the on-screen keyboard will fill the screen.

Alan Dechert

==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
Received on Sun Aug 31 23:17:14 2003

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Sun Aug 31 2003 - 23:17:18 CDT