Re: Reflections on trusting trust

From: Skip Montanaro <skip_at_pobox_dot_com>
Date: Sat Aug 16 2003 - 17:23:44 CDT

[ on the ability to audit the executable code, whatever that is ]

This is extremely important stuff. The casual observer might say, "I trust
my local election board", however election boards are probably rarely
computer-savvy and probably wouldn't know how to secure EVMs. That means
they have to depend on their vendors, who apparently haven't had the
greatest track record so far.

    Doug> This is made less of a problem, though, by the presence of a paper
    Doug> trail!

    David> I am 100% in agreement here!

    David> This is such a fundamental, obvious, and important point, that is
    David> jaw-dropping how many elections people have missed it hitherto.

Agreed, and since so many people seem to miss this point, all the arguments
in favor of it have to be made in clear terms, hopefully ones non-computer
folk can understand. I think it would help immensely if some examples were
presented which show that such object code tampering has happened in the
past (has such a thing been demonstrated?). It will almost certainly have
been done to secure something less valuable than nationally elected offices.

Skip
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Received on Sun Aug 31 23:17:10 2003

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