Fwd: Re: NIST VVPAT Standards as of Now

From: Rick Gideon <rick_at_openvoting_dot_org>
Date: Thu Apr 21 2005 - 12:13:31 CDT

This was passed on from votersunite.org.


>-----Original Message-----
>From: truevotelist-bounces@mail.truevotemd.org
>[mailto:truevotelist-bounces@mail.truevotemd.org]On Behalf Of STAN BOYD
>Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2005 8:31 PM
>To: truevotelist@mail.truevotemd.org
>Subject: [TrueVote] HELP! Can you answer any of these quesitons about
>Today I attended the meeting of the Technical Guidelines Development
>Committee (TGDC) which met at NIST to finalize recommendations for standards
>for voting machines. Tomorrow will be the final day and then the
>recommendations will be passed on to the EAC. There are two men representing
>the National Association of State Election Directors who seem determined to
>prevent states from using voting machines that include a VVPAT. But there
>are at least two members on the Committee who definitely favor the VVPAT.
>The Honorable Donetta Davidson (Colorado Secretary of State) is one (her
>state uses machines that provide a VVPAT). She asked me if I knew anyone
>that is familiar with what the various VVPAT machines can and cannot do.
>She promised that she will do her best to change the wording of the final
>recommendations so these machines will not be prohibited from being used by
>the states in 2006. But someone needs to attend the meeting tomorrow (it
>will be almost impo ssible for me to go).
>1. If you can answer any or all of the questions below, please email me the
>answers. The Committee is about to require machines with VVPAT to meet the
>following requirements. If there are any on the list that probably could NOT
>be met by the vendors within the next 8 months, please let me know, so we
>can ask Mrs. Davidson to change the wording from SHALL to SHOULD (which
>means after the 2006 elections). Here are the proposed requirements:
> The voting machine must enable the blind and partially blind to
>operate it independently without any assistance, meeting all federal
>guidelines required of regular DREs.
> The voting station shall be capable of showing the information in
>at least two font ranges (3.0-4.0mm and 6.3-9.0 mm)
> The paper and electronic records shall be presented so as to
>allow for easy, simultaneous comparison (at the same eye level).
> If the paper record cannot be displayed in its entirety, a means
>shall be provided to allow the voter to view the entire ballot
> If the paper record cannot be displayed on a single page, each
>page of the record shall be numbered and the last page shallbe clearly
> The voting station shall display, print, and store a paper record
>in any of the alternative languages chosen for making ballot selections
> For purposes of verification, candidate names on the records
>shall be in English.
> The voting station shall allow the voter to approve or spoil the
>paper record, and shall,in the presence of the voter, mark the paper record
>as being accepted by the voter or spoiled.
> Prior to maximum number of spoiled ballots occurring,the voting
>station shall display a warning message to the voter indicating that the
>voter may spoil only one more ballot
> If the maximum number of spoiled ballots occurs, procedures
>shall be in place to permit the voter to otherwise cast a ballot.
> Conditions that prevent a voter review of the paper record that
>are detectable to the voting station shall cause an error message to be
>displayed and shall prevent recordgin of the electronic record.
> Vendor documentation shall include procedures for returning a
>voting stationto correct operation after a voter has used it incompletely or
>incorrectly; this procedure shall not cause discrepancies between the
>tallies of the electronic and paper records.
> The voter's privacy and anonymity shall be preserved during the
>process of recording, verifying,and auditing ballot choices (both on
>electronic and paper records).
> The voter shall not be able to leave the voting area with the
>paper record if the information on the paper record can reveal to another
>person the voter's choices.
> The privacy and anonymity of voters unable to manually handle
>paper and who use an accessible voting station that requires manual storage
>of the paper record into a ballot box shall be maintained.
> The voting station's ballot records shall be structured and contain
>information so as to support highly precise audits of their accuracy.
> All cryptographic software in the voting system shall have been
>approved by the U.S. Government's Crypto Module Validation Program as
> The electronic and paper records shall be linked by including a
>unique identifier within each record that can be used to identify each
>record uniquely and each record's corresponding record. (so the two separate
>records can be compared)
> The voting station shall generate and store a digital signature
>for each electronic record.
> The electronic records shall be able to be exported for auditing
>or analysis on standards based and/or COTS information technology computing
> The paper record shall be created such that its contents are
> Any automatic accumulation of electronic or paper records shall be
>capable of detecting and discarding duplicate copies of the records.
> The voting system vendor shall provide full documentation of
>procedures for exporting its electronic recors and reconciling its
>electronic records with its paper records.
> The voting station shall be physically secure from tampering,
>including international damage.
> The voting station shall communicate with its printers over a
>standard publicly documented printer port using a standard communication
> The paper path between the printing, viewing and storage of the
>paper record shall be protected and sealed from access except by authorized
>election officials.
> The printer shall not be permitted to communicate with any
>other system or machine other than the single voting machine to which it is
> The printer shall only be able to function as a printer; it
>cannot spool information or contain any services (e.g. copying, faxing) or
>network capability.
> The ballot box storing the paper records shall be sealed and
>secured and no access shall be provided to polling place workers.
> Tamper-evident seals or physical security measures shall
>protect the connection between the printer and the voting machine, so that
>the connection cannot be broken or interfered with without leaving extensive
>and obvious evidence.
> The voting station shall detect errors and malfunctionssuch as
>paper jams or low supplies of consumables such as paper and ink that may
>prevent paper records from being correctly displayed or printed or stored.
> If errors or malfunctions occur, the voting station shall
>suspend voting operations and shall present a clear indication to the voter
>and elections workers of the malfunctions.
> Vendor documentation shall include procedures for investigating
>and resolving malfunctions including but not limited to misreporting of
>votes, unreadable paper records, paper jams, low ink, misfeeds, and power
> Protective coverings intended to be transparent on voting station
>devices shall be maintainable via a predefined cleaning process.If the
>coverings become damaged such that they obscure the paper record, they shall
>be replaced.
> The paper record shall be sturdy, clean, and of sufficient
>durability to be used for manual auditing, machine auditing, and recounts
>conducted manually and via machine reading equipment. It shall be able to be
>stored without degradation for 22 months within the temperature and humidity
>ranges specified by the manufacturer. The paper record shall be stored in
>an approved containerthat protects it from sustaining bends, creases and
>edge dents.

John Gideon
Information Manager

VotersUnite! is a national non-partisan organization dedicated to fair and
accurate elections. It focuses on distributing well-researched information
to elections officials, elected officials, the media, and the public; as
well as providing activists with information they need to work toward
transparent elections in their communities.

OVC discuss mailing lists
Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
Received on Sat Apr 30 23:17:11 2005

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Sat Apr 30 2005 - 23:17:22 CDT