Re: More on barcodes, etc

From: Edmund R. Kennedy <ekennedyx_at_yahoo_dot_com>
Date: Mon Apr 18 2005 - 16:53:48 CDT

Hello David:

Is the Archive working well enough for me to direct
Ron to it?

Ron, we have explicitly discussed the first item in
the last 12-18 months. As for the second, were you
volunteering?

Thanks, Ed Kennedy

--- Ron Crane <voting@lastland.net> wrote:

> This nicely segues into the question of who actually
> will produce
> systems based upon our software, and what degree of
> trust attaches to
> that relationship. It also raises the question of
> when our software is
> going to be available, which leads to a discussion
> of milestones and so
> forth.
>
> -Ron
>
> On Apr 18, 2005, at 1:22 PM, Edmund R. Kennedy
> wrote:
>
> > Hello Arthur:
> >
> > Hello OVC:
> >
> > This brings us nicely to the issue of who our
> > customers are. Ideally, the voter is our
> customer.
> > However, the decision makers will likely be in the
> > County Registrar of Voters office (or =). Also,
> the
> > County officials cannot consider the EVM unless it
> is
> > certified on the Federal and State levels. I
> think
> > this sequenced identification of customers is the
> > lesson that the DRE vendors know and we may yet
> have
> > to learn.
> >
> > Thanks, Ed Kennedy
> >
> >
> > --- Arthur Keller <voting@kellers.org> wrote:
> >
> >> I agree with this idea, but think that threat
> >> analyses and voter concerns
> >> are also important.
> >>
> >> Best regards,
> >> Arthur
> >>
> >>> Hello Alan:
> >>>
> >>> 1. Bar code or OCR? Have them both as a
> >> switchable
> >>> option. Let the election official make the
> call.
> >> You
> >>> can promote the use of bar codes in the
> >> documentation
> >>> or instructions but let the people on the spot
> >> take
> >>> the heat for their own decisions.
> >>>
> >>> 2. Election cycle initiation: Token or
> >> otherwise?
> >>> Again, make this an option that is picked by the
> >>> County Registrar or equal.
> >>>
> >>> 3. Summary paper ballot versus full mark sense
> >>> ballot? Make both styles of output available.
> >>>
> >>> Down with either/or. Do them both. If we can
> >> argue
> >>> competing virtues and admit that each choice has
> >>> strengths and weaknesses then all the choices
> >> should
> >>> be available.
> >>>
> >>> If both testing and experience show that one
> >> method is
> >>> vastly superior to the other and election
> >> officials
> >>> are generally in agreement, then options can be
> >>> removed in later versions. Otherwise, this is
> not
> >> a
> >>> battle worth fighting.
> >>>
> >>> Thanks, Ed Kennedy
> >>>
> >>> --- Alan Dechert <dechert@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Arthur wrote,
> >>>>
> >>>>> How many blind people say they prefer the
> >> current
> >>>> approach?
> >>>>> How many sighted people say they are concerned
> >>>> about the
> >>>>> barcode? When OVC's CTO speaks about
> >> technology
> >>>> along with
> >>>>> an acclaimed and accomplished technologist, I
> >>>> think that
> >>>>> retreating behind "go and demo it" is
> >> unfortunate.
> >>>>
> >>>>> Certainly a demo with a barcode is easier to
> >>>> produce.
> >>>>> It's not at all clear that the production
> >> version
> >>>> should use
> >>>>> a barcode. The paper talks about OCR'ing the
> >>>> text, by the way.
> >>>>>
> >>>> Barcode issues surfaced in some off-list
> >> discussions
> >>>> we were having
> >>>> recently. We've had extensive discussions
> about
> >>>> barcodes in the past,
> >>>> and some of the issues remain unresolved.
> >> Arthur's
> >>>> email warrants a
> >>>> detailed response, so here goes.
> >>>>
> >>>> First I want to talk a little about official
> OVC
> >>>> policy -- where it
> >>>> comes from. The OVC president/CEO (currently
> me,
> >>>> Alan Dechert)
> >>>> represents official OVC policy. This is by
> >>>> necessity. Someone has to
> >>>> articulate these policies publicly. Sometimes
> >> these
> >>>> policies appear
> >>>> in print; sometimes these policies are conveyed
> >> in
> >>>> email to other
> >>>> interested parties; sometimes these are
> conveyed
> >>>> personally at events
> >>>> at which OVC is involved. It's my job to know
> >> what
> >>>> those policies
> >>>> are. When issues arise in various fora, I
> can't
> >>>> say, "I don't know, I
> >>>> have to ask the board." I have to know the
> >> issues
> >>>> and know where OVC
> >>>> stands on these issues.
> >>>>
> >>>> Generally speaking, OVC policy is set by
> >> consensus.
> >>>> Theoretically,
> >>>> the OVC board of directors has the power to set
> >>>> policy. Some policies
> >>>> are set that way but most policy decisions have
> >> been
> >>>> made outside of
> >>>> board meetings. This informal consensus rule
> >>>> generally holds for the
> >>>> board too since we've never decided anything
> with
> >>>> some close vote like
> >>>> 4-3, or 3-2, etc. Almost everything we decide
> at
> >>>> board meetings is
> >>>> unanimous with some abstentions here and there.
> >> We
> >>>> tend to vote on
> >>>> things only after we've had enough discussion
> to
> >>>> agree on what we want
> >>>> to say.
> >>>>
> >>>> A great deal of OVC policy was grandfathered-in
> >> --
> >>>> the product of
> >>>> discussions that took place before OVC was
> >> founded.
> >>>> Mostly, these
> >>>> policy decisions were made in conjunction with
> >> our
> >>>> various academic
> >>>> partners over the years. In April of 2001
> Henry
> >>>> Brady asked, "so how
> >>>> will people make money with this system?" We
> >>>> started to describe
> >>>> (conjuring, modeling) how the organization
> might
> >>>> work.
> >>>>
> >>>> A lot of things were decided APR 2003 - July
> >> 2003.
> >>>> Someone recently
> >>>> asked if OVC endorses IRV. OVC is neutral on
> >>>> scoring methods because
> >>>> one of the main discussants back then, Arnie
> >> Urken,
> >>>> insisted that we
> >>>> remain neutral on scoring methods. Everyone
> else
> >>>> involved then agreed
> >>>> and no one has ever made a case for changing
> that
> >>>> policy. That's how
> >>>> the policy was made. During this period, Doug
> >> Jones
> >>>> played a major
> >>>> role shaping the OVC model. My wife Lori and
> Jay
> >>>> Tefertiller (ISIS
> >>>> Technology) worked out a lot of legal and
> >>>> organizational issues (we
> >>>> decided to be a "consortium"). Arthur Keller
> >> played
> >>>> a major role too
> >>>> beginning in July of 2003. Doug and I cobbled
> >>>> together the bylaws in
> >>>> NOV - DEC 2003. Ed Cherlin, David Mertz and
> >> quite a
> >>>> few other
> >>>> engineers contributed ideas
> >>>>
> >>>> In 2003 (and earlier), we consistently heard
> DRE
> >>>> makers and their
> >>>> "supporters" (dare I say paid shills?) insist
> >> that
> >>>> paper printouts
> >>>> were unfair to reading impaired voters since
> >> these
> >>>> voters cannot
> >>>> verify the vote on paper. This position was
> >>>> expressed in a videotaped
> >>>> presentation by Marion Taylor of the League of
> >> Women
> >>>> Voters at the UC
> >>>> Santa Cruz forum on electronic voting we
> >> organized
> >>>> (mainly Bob Kibrick
> >>>> and Arthur Keller) in OCT 2003.
> >>>>
> >>>> Long before the debates in 2003, I had come up
> >> with
> >>>> the idea of
> >>>> putting a barcode on the long edges of the
> >> printout
> >>>> so a blind person
> >>>> could utilize the barcode while keeping the
> text
> >>>> hidden from view
> >>>> (Actually, Ryan Ronco, assistant ROV in Placer
> >>>> County CA suggested the
> >>>> barcode to me in APR 2001. Ryan was mainly
> >>>> suggesting it as a way to
> >>>> facilitate tabulation. I moved it to the edge
> as
> >> an
> >>>> accessibility
> >>>> feature).
> >>>>
> >>>> As I designed the ballot for our demo, I
> figured
> >> out
> >>>> what barcode
> >>>> system I wanted to use. I decided on Code 128
> >>>> because it could encode
> >>>> all the information we needed to encode and
> >> scanners
> >>>> could be had dirt
> >>>> cheap (I bought a bunch of scanners for about a
> >>>> dollar each). I
> >>>> looked for GPL'd Code 128 software and found
> Jan
> >>>> Karrman. Jan joined
> >>>> the project. Most of the technical issues with
> >> the
> >>>> barcode were
> >>>> worked out between Jan and I. Sidebar: An
> >> example
> >>>> of some OVC policy
> >>>> making .... David Mertz insisted that it might
> be
> >>>> possible for someone
> >>>> to discern some information about the ballots
> by
> >>>> eyeballing the
> >>>> barcodes. I never believed that. We came up
> >> with
> >>>> an obfuscation
> >>>> routine that was easy to implement and cost
> >> nothing,
> >>>> so I went along
> >>>> with it. If it was all up to me, I wouldn't
> have
> >>>> bothered with it.
> >>>> The gain was small but the cost was negligible.
> >> In
> >>>> other words, OVC
> >>>> policy is sometimes contrary to what I believe.
> >> If
> >>>> the consensus
> >>>> opinion is contrary to what I believe, I'm glad
> >> to
> >>>> go along with it so
> >>>> long as it doesn't conflict with some concepts
> I
> >>>> hold and consider
> >>>> basic and important.
> >>>>
> >>>> The scheme we demonstrated for reading-impaired
> >>>> ballot verification
> >>>> was very important. We publicly shattered a
> very
> >>>> persistent myth.
> >>>> Shawn Casey O'Brien, a disabled rights
> activist,
> >>>> showed up at our OCT
> >>>> 2003 UC Santa Cruz forum and gave a speech
> >>>> denouncing the paper trail
> >>>> because it was useless to blind people. I
> >>>> demonstrated why he was
> >>>> wrong about that, and ended the debate. You
> >> don't
> >>>> hear anyone making
> >>>> that claim anymore (blind can't verify paper
> >>>> ballot). All opinion
> >>>> leaders know it's false. No disabled rights
> >>>> activists have shown up
> >>>> at any of our events since OCT of 2003 to make
> >> that
> >>>> claim. OVC can't
> >>>> take all the credit for that since others have
> >> made
> >>>> the point too. I
> >>>> do think it's fair to say we played a major
> role
> >> in
> >>>> dispelling this
> >>>> myth. Since accessibility has been a major
> theme
> >> in
> >>>> voting
> >>>> modernization, it was absolutely necessary to
> >> break
> >>>> this myth in order
> >>>> to get the idea of a computer generated "paper
> >>>> trail" accepted for
> >>>> voting.
> >>>>
> >>>> Some credible technologists (and others less
> >>>> technical) have said that
> >>>> we should do away with the barcode since it
> seems
> >> to
> >>>> be contrary to
> >>>> the goal of transparency in election
> >> administration.
> >>>> I don't happen
> >>>> to believe that, but I'm happy to go along with
> >> it
> >>>> since switching to
> >>>> OCR does not impact the overall veracity of the
> >> OVC
> >>>> approach. I am
> >>>> perfectly willing to say, now, that while our
> >> demo
> >>>> utilizes the
> >>>> barcode, our production system may not. I see
> >> pros
> >>>> and cons. I see
> >>>> tradeoffs. I see perceptual issues.
> >>>>
> >>>> Before getting into some of the pros and cons,
> >> let's
> >>>> lay out some main
> >>>> principles as a backdrop for the discussion.
> >>>>
> >>>> First Principle: the voter is paramount.
> >>>> --------------------------------------------
> >>>> The voting system should be designed and built
> >> with
> >>>> this principle in
> >>>> mind. Security, trustworthiness, cost,
> clarity,
> >>>> simplicity,
> >>>> ease-of-use, accuracy, accessibility,
> >> auditability,
> >>>> inclusiveness,
> >>>> convenience are all important issues in
> election
> >>>> administration. But
> >>>> what's secure, trustworthy, inexpensive, clear,
> >>>> simple, easy-to-use,
> >>>> accurate, accessible, auditable, inclusive, and
> >>>> convenient for
> >>>> election administrators must be secondary to
> >> what's
> >>>> secure,
> >>>> trustworthy, inexpensive, clear, simple,
> >>>> easy-to-use, accurate,
> >>>> accessible, auditable, inclusive, and
> convenient
> >> for
> >>>> voters.
> >>>>
> >>>> The voting system is for voters, and paid for
> by
> >>>> voters.
> >>>>
> >>>> Second Principle: costs must be minimized
> >>>>
> >>
> ---------------------------------------------------
> >>>> The four billion dollars being spent on voting
> >>>> modernization is a
> >>>> fluke of history. Before 2002, states and
> >> counties
> >>>> have never had
> >>>> much money for voting equipment, and should not
> >>>> expect a lot of money
> >>>> to be available in the future for new voting
> >>>> equipment. Budgets are
> >>>> constrained everywhere. Expensive voting
> systems
> >>>> means long lines and
> >>>> voter disenfranchisement. Ultimately, open
> >> voting
> >>>> will take hold
> >>>> through market forces -- open voting systems
> must
> >> be
> >>>> very inexpensive.
> >>>>
> >>>> Also, if America is to maintain a leadership
> role
> >> in
> >>>> promoting
> >>>> democracy through out the world, we have to
> show
> >> how
> >>>> a great voting
> >>>> system can be built and maintained
> inexpensively.
> >>>> How many
> >>>> jurisdictions in developing countries could
> >>>> contemplate deploying the
> >>>> $5,000 AutoMark system? It's a ridiculous
> waste
> >> of
> >>>> resources.
> >>>>
> >>>> Third Principle: election process must be fully
> >>>> auditable
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
>
----------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>> Institutional protocols must be in place to
> >> enable
> >>>> full public audit
> >>>> of all aspects of election administration. If
> >> there
> >>>> is anything a
> >>>> voter wants to know about election
> >> administration,
> >>>> he or she should be
> >>>> able to get answers in whatever level of detail
> >>>> desired without ever
> >>>> hearing, "trust us" or some other indication
> that
> >>>> information about
> >>>> the voting system is not available to them.
> >>>>
> >>>> Fourth Principle: Election administration is
> not
> >> --
> >>>> and can never be
> >>>> -- a computerized process
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> > ----------
> >>>> The process of administering elections mainly
> >>>> involves procedures
> >>>> carried out by people. Computers can assist in
> >> the
> >>>> process, but can
> >>>> never be expected to run elections. Computers
> >> can
> >>>> enhance the
> >>>> security and accuracy of election
> administration,
> >> as
> >>>> well as keep
> >>>> costs down.
> >>>>
> >>>> There are other important principles, but these
> >> are
> >>>> the three main
> >>>> ones I want to keep in mind right now. In
> light
> >> of
> >>>> the foregoing, I
> >>>> have the following observations about the
> barcode
> >> v.
> >>>> OCR debate with
> >>>> respect to the computer generated summary paper
> >>>> ballot;
> >>>>
> >>>> 1) Machine reading should be incorporated into
> >> the
> >>>> process of counting
> >>>> votes. Computer reading can act as a check
> >> against
> >>>> human error, and
> >>>> vice-versa. Security and accuracy will be best
> >> when
> >>>> both computer and
> >>>> human counting are employed.
> >>>>
> >>>> 2) A barcoded ballot may be more tamper
> resistant
> >>>> than one with no
> >>>> barcode. We expect that rules surrounding the
> >> OVC
> >>>> barcoded summary
> >>>> paper ballot would include a rule that says
> >>>> something like, "No
> >>>> pencil, pen, etc. marks of any kind are to be
> >> made
> >>>> on the summary
> >>>> paper ballot. If you want to change anything
> on
> >> the
> >>>> ballot, you must
> >>>> re-do the process and print a new ballot. Any
> >> hand
> >>>> markings on a cast
> >>>> ballot will be ignored." The rule should be
> >>>> ironclad. Voters will be
> >>>> encouraged to carefully review their ballot
> >>>> on-screen before printing.
> >>>> If there are scribbles on a barcode, it may
> >> still
> >>>> be readable or the
> >>>> other duplicate barcode could be read instead.
> >> We
> >>>> could also place
> >>>> another copy of the barcode in the text area if
> >>>> necessary, and/or
> >>>> another version of a barcode (not easily
> >>>> recognizable as a barcode)
> >>>> could be included that may be read by a special
> >>>> reader in case a
> >>>> ballot has been defaced. An OCR only summary
> >> paper
> >>>> ballot may not
> >>>> work well with such a rule (hand markings
> >> ignored).
> >>>> A cross-out may
> >>>> cause the OCR reading to fail. If the mark-out
> >> is
> >>>> complete, or the
> >>>> selection torn off, it may be impossible to
> >>>> determine what was printed
> >>>> on the ballot.
> >>>>
> >>>> 3) OCR-only is not any more transparent, and
> may
> >> be
> >>>> even less
> >>>> transparent than a barcoded ballot. For
> example,
> >> the
> >>>> architecture we
> >>>> are employing involves using the machine
> reading
> >> to
> >>>> create a
> >>>> reconstructed electronic ballot image (REBI)
> and
> >>>> compare that with the
> >>>> electronic ballot image (EBI) from the voting
> >>>> machine for that
> >>>> particular ballot. If the contents of the REBI
> >> and
> >>>> EBI match, the
> >>>> machine reading was accurate. However, this
> >> proof
> >>>> alone is not
> >>>> adequate. If malware is installed, it's
> >> conceivable
> >>>> that while the
> >>>> REBI and EBI match, they don't match the
> printed
> >>>> text. The lie would
> >>>> work differently for OCR as opposed to barcode,
> >> but
> >>>> could still give a
> >>>> phony result in either case.
> >>>>
> >>>> You vote for Smith, but Jones is recorded in
> the
> >>>> EBI. Smith is
> >>>> printed on the ballot.
> >>>>
> >>>> Let's say a tiny number "3" is placed in a
> >> strategic
> >>>> location on the
> >>>> printout For the OCR system, it can read the
> >>>> ballot and report
> >>>> "Smith" but also sees the tiny 3 and knows that
> >> it
> >>>> should record this
> >>>> as a vote for Jones, the third candidate in the
> >>>> contest. The REBI and
> >>>> EBI both say Jones. Jones gets the vote
> despite
> >>>> what is printed on
> >>>> the ballot.
> >>>>
> >>>> The barcode could be similarly encoded to lie
> to
> >> the
> >>>> voter saying,
> >>>> correctly, that "Smith" is printed on the
> ballot
> >>>> while Jones is
> >>>> getting the vote.
> >>>>
> >>>> Given that OCR software is quite complex, it
> >> would
> >>>> be difficult to
> >>>> spot malware that could cause printed ballots
> to
> >>>> reflect the voter's
> >>>> choices but record the electronic vote
> otherwise.
> >>>>
> >>>> So, regardless of whether we employ OCR or
> >> barcode,
> >>>> a manual check of
> >>>> the electronic record against the printed text
> >> must
> >>>> be standard
> >>>> procedure. A computerized voting system with a
> >>>> paper ballot is no
> >>>> more secure than a computerized system without
> a
> >>>> paper ballot if all
> >>>> the checking is done by computer. So long as
> >> audit
> >>>> procedures are in
> >>>> place to check the printout against the
> >> electronic
> >>>> record, malware has
> >>>> a very low chance of success on a system with
> the
> >>>> summary paper
> >>>> ballot. The OCR/barcode debate doesn't matter
> in
> >>>> this regard.
> >>>>
> >>>> 4) OCR may be no more transparent or secure
> than
> >>>> using a barcode, but
> >>>> it may appear more secure. Appearance is
> >> important
> >>>> so this should
> >>>> count for something. Most likely, the average
> >>>> person understands no
> >>>> more about how OCR software works than s/he
> >>>> understands about how
> >>>> barcode software works. On the other hand,
> >> barcodes
> >>>> are ubiquitous --
> >>>> trusted tools of commerce. It's not clear
> which
> >> the
> >>>> public would
> >>>> prefer. Trials and surveys are needed.
> >>>>
> >>>> 5) Our experience has been that people that
> raise
> >>>> objections about the
> >>>> barcode are usually objecting to machine
> counting
> >>>> altogether -- these
> >>>> people are often nontechnical. They want hand
> >>>> counting instead. They
> >>>> may be no happier with OCR. We also find that
> >> these
> >>>> objections are
> >>>> not necessarily unmoveable. Most people get
> over
> >>>> the objection
> >>>> without too much difficulty when it's explained
> >> how
> >>>> the system works
> >>>> and that manual checks will be in place to
> verify
> >>>> that the readout
> >>>> from the barcode matches the printed text.
> >>>>
> >>>> 6) OCR may be less accurate than barcodes. The
> >>>> barcode with good
> >>>> error detection should be 100% accurate. That
> >> is,
> >>>> if you get a read,
> >>>> the odds are astronomically high that it's
> right.
> >>>>
> >>>> 7) An OCR scanning station might be more
> >> difficult
> >>>> for blind voters.
> >>>> If the blind voter has to remove the ballot
> from
> >> the
> >>>> folder to insert
> >>>> it into some device, there is a risk that the
> >> voter
> >>>> will drop the
> >>>> ballot or have some other difficulty --
> >> especially
> >>>> considering that
> >>>> blind voters sometimes have other disabilities.
> >> The
> >>>> only way to
> >>>> really find out would be to build both OCR and
> >>>> barcode stations and
> >>>> see which work better for reading impaired
> >> voters.
> >>>>
> >>>> 8) An interesting test I'd like to see: two
> >>>> different mock elections,
> >>>> one utilizing OCR and one with barcode. Set up
> >> the
> >>>> verification
> >>>> station for each. Will normal reading/sighted
> >> users
> >>>> use the
> >>>> verification station? Some small percentage
> >> would
> >>>> use the
> >>>> verification station for barcoded ballots. My
> >> guess
> >>>> is that for the
> >>>> OCR system, they will use it much less if at
> all.
> >>>> In both cases, if
> >>>> the mock election was repeated with the same
> >>>> subjects, I predict that
> >>>> usage of the verification stations would be
> less
> >> the
> >>>> next time. It
> >>>> may be that our verification station was for
> the
> >>>> demo only.
> >>>> Especially if we go to OCR, I don't think it
> >> would
> >>>> be used enough to
> >>>> justify setting up. This may be a good thing.
> >> If
> >>>> we have one system
> >>>> set up for voters that need the accessible
> >> system,
> >>>> the verification
> >>>> station may be integrated with that.
> >>>>
> >>>> 9) OCR print may compromise human readability
> of
> >> the
> >>>> ballot. If
> >>>> you're not worried about OCR, you can optimize
> >> the
> >>>> text for
> >>>> readability for humans. A fixed width font may
> >> work
> >>>> best for OCR but
> >>>> will be less efficiently read by humans. It
> may
> >> not
> >>>> fit as easily on
> >>>> the printout as a proportional font. If we
> adopt
> >>>> User Centered Design
> >>>> principles and place the voter as the primary
> >> user,
> >>>> this may rule out
> >>>> OCR.
> >>>>
> >>>> 10) Precinct level tabulation may be slower or
> >> more
> >>>> expensive with
> >>>> OCR. I suspect that a station to count, say,
> 500
> >>>> ballots, will be
> >>>> more expensive and/or take longer than a
> station
> >>>> that reads the
> >>>> barcodes with a hand-held scanner. Again, this
> >> is
> >>>> speculation and
> >>>> real data would only come with trials and
> >>>> experiments.
> >>>>
> >>>> Summary
> >>>> --------------
> >>>> In summary, I still think the barcoded ballot
> >> with
> >>>> manual verification
> >>>> that the text matches the electronic ballot
> >> image,
> >>>> is the most
> >>>> efficient way to go. OCR does not eliminate the
> >> need
> >>>> for the manual
> >>>> check. Open source helps too but is not a
> >> cure-all
> >>>> either.
> >>>> OCR may be more saleable, on the other hand.
> >> Some
> >>>> of the questions
> >>>> may be approachable even without major funding.
> >> But
> >>>> real answers to
> >>>> some of the questions above would require some
> >> real
> >>>> tests.
> >>>>
> >>>> I have no problem with the assertion that an
> OVC
> >>>> production system may
> >>>> not include a barcode. I would like to see
> some
> >>>> trials though.
> >>>>
> >>>> Alan D.
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> OVC discuss mailing lists
> >>>> Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> >>>> arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> 10777 Bendigo Cove
> >>> San Diego, CA 92126-2510
> >>>
> >>> 858-578-8842
> >>>
> >>> Work for the common good.
> >>> My profile: <http://geocities.com/ekennedyx/>
> >>> I blog now and then at:
> >> <http://ekennedyx.blogspot.com/>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> OVC discuss mailing lists
> >>> Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> >>> arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> OVC discuss mailing lists
> >> Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> >> arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
> >>
> >
> >
> > --
> > 10777 Bendigo Cove
> > San Diego, CA 92126-2510
> >
> > 858-578-8842
> >
> > Work for the common good.
> > My profile: <http://geocities.com/ekennedyx/>
> > I blog now and then at:
> <http://ekennedyx.blogspot.com/>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OVC discuss mailing lists
> > Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> > arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> OVC discuss mailing lists
> Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to
> arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
>

-- 
10777 Bendigo Cove
San Diego, CA 92126-2510
858-578-8842
Work for the common good.
My profile:  <http://geocities.com/ekennedyx/>
I blog now and then at:  <http://ekennedyx.blogspot.com/>
_______________________________________________
OVC discuss mailing lists
Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
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Received on Sat Apr 30 23:17:10 2005

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