Re: Shamos rebuttal -- re-visit

From: Kathy Dopp <kathy_at_uscountvotes_dot_org>
Date: Tue Apr 12 2005 - 17:42:26 CDT

Alan Dechert wrote:

>I wrote the following last year to the voting-project list. I was
>hoping to get some good input but for some reason I got very little
>feedback. I want to re-visit this because someone wanting to rebut
>Shamos found this article and wants to submit it to officials in PA.
>
>Please, if some of you could sharpen your pencils and go over this,
>I'd appreciate it.
>
>

Alan, I'm only offering a shoot-from-the-hip suggestion since I'm fairly
busy (We have ten more days in the battle to stop DRE voting machines in
Utah and USCV is keeping me busy and my personal life needs radical
repairs.)

How about these ideas:

 "Would you drive over a bridge that 95% of engineers told you would
fall down?" Yet, 95% of computer scientists in the largest organization
of computing professionals, the ACM, warn against the use of voting
equipment that is not independently auditable. (and add a footnote with
the URL of the online ACM.org poll).

"Unless we want election results to be determined by undetected innocent
errors, electronic failures, and manipulation, we need voting systems
that use a paper ballot that the voter can verify and that local
election officials can independently recount."

Thassal. Keep it simple and short. Cite the conservative Utah computer
scientists and what they recommend too if you would like:
http://utahcountvotes.org/voting_system_advice.pdf

Good luck. Keep up the good fight. It was great meeting Laura again. We
had fun in Nashville and accomplished a lot - even made some inroads on
convincing that BallotIntegrity folks that all handcounted paper is
insufficient.

Kathy

>Alan D.
>
>********
>OVC Response to Paper v. Electronic Voting Records -- An Assessment,
>by Michael Ian Shamos
>This message: [ Message body ] [ More options ]
>Related messages: [ Next message ] [ Previous message ]
>From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
>Date: Fri Jul 30 2004 - 22:11:03 CDT
>
>Michael Ian Shamos is often quoted by individuals and organizations that
>want to say DREs are the way to go. He is a highly credible individual, so
>what he says on this subject matters a great deal.
>
>
>The more I look at it, the more his arguments seem incredibly bad. David
>Jefferson, a friend of Shamos for 30 years, has said that he is doing a lot
>of damage and his POV on DREs should be discredited.
>
>
>Here is a paper he wrote for the CFP 2004 conference we were at.
>
>
>http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/people/faculty/mshamos/paper.htm#_edn1
>
>
>I have made a rough first cut at a response. I'd like to go through a few
>iterations on this and then distribute it to the press and other interested
>parties.
>
>
>*************
>OVC Response to Paper v. Electronic Voting Records -- An Assessment, by
>Michael Ian Shamos
>
>
>Professor Shamos published this paper in April of 2004. This paper is
>deeply flawed, but it deserves a careful response for three main reasons:
>
>
>1) The OVC is flatly opposed to invisible ballots (DREs) created with secret
>software. Shamos argues in favor of invisible ballots.
>
>
>2) Professor Shamos in one of few prominent scientists that argues in favor
>of invisible ballots. His testimony is often used by organizations seeking
>to bolster their support of DREs.
>
>
>3) Although some of his arguments appear to be wrong, Professor Shamos makes
>many excellent points worthy of consideration and support.
>
>
>Shamos shows a fondness for defeating arguments no one is making. The paper
>is full of strawmen. It appears that Shamos has not really followed or
>considered what some of the leading thinkers in this area have been saying.
>He mischaracterizes or ignores them.
>
>
>The title itself is weak. "Paper v. Electronic Voting Records" is not really
>the issue here. We want to know where the authentic vote exists. Should it
>be purely electronic? He does not consider the possibility of paper ballots
>(where the actual vote exists) produced with computerized voting systems
>where there is also an electronic audit trail. He does not discuss ideas
>for reconciling paper and electronic records.
>
>
>He starts by listing eight claims made by DRE opponents. Then he says,
>"Each of these arguments will be examined in this paper and found fatally
>flawed.." Could it be that he constructed these 8 arguments in such a way
>that they could be easily refuted?
>
>
> 1) Voting machines are "black boxes" whose workings
> are opaque to the public and whose feedback to the
> voter is generated by the black boxes themselves.
> Therefore, whether or not they are operating properly
> cannot be independently verified and the machines
> should not be used.
>
>
>The issue here is not so much about whether they can be independently
>verified: it's that they aren't independently verified [to be operating
>properly]. Certainly, they cannot be verified with black box testing alone.
>
>
> 2) No amount of code auditing can ever detect malicious
> or even innocently erroneous software. Therefore the
> machines should not be used.
>
>
>Again, this is not really the issue. It's not about whether the auditor can
>spot malicious or erroneous code during a code audit, it's about whether or
>not they will. Given the track record of code that has been certified, it
>appears auditors have a very limited focus in these code audits.
>
>
> 3) No feasible test plan can ever exercise every possible
> combination of inputs to the machine or exercise every
> one of its logic paths. Therefore the machines should
> not be used.
>
>
>I suppose that every professional test engineer knows that the first
>sentence is absolutely true [for software of medium or better complexity].
>This fact by itself is not why paperless voting systems should not be used,
>but it's part of the reason.
>
>
> 4) Hackers can break into the FBI's servers and deface its website.
> It ought to be child's play for them to throw an election.
> Therefore the machines should not be used.
>
>
>Who is making this argument? Generally, it's true that hackers come up with
>remarkable tricks that no one thought possible.
>
>
> 5) DRE machines have been plagued by a host of failures all
> around the country. Therefore the machines should not be used.
>
>
>These failures illustrate some of the costs/benefits of DREs. Right now, it
>appears that many jurisdictions have spent a lot of money on technology that
>is immature and that will be obsolete soon. It just looks like a bad
>investment.
>
>
> 6) The DRE industry is dominated by a small number
> of companies, some of whose executives are announced
> supporters of the Republican party. An executive could
> command his programmers to add code to each machine
> manufactured by that company to move votes to a
> favored candidate, thus determining the outcome of the
> election. Therefore the machines should not be used.
>
>
>While some have characterized paperless voting as a Republican conspiracy,
>this is small minority of critics. Interestingly, we are seeing some
>Republicans saying that Democrats will use paperless systems to rig the
>vote. The OVC position is that it must be assumed that all people involved
>in election administration, as well as all the voters, are partisan. The
>integrity of the voting system must not depend, at any point, on people (or
>groups of people) being honest, non-partisan, or uninterested in the
>outcome. The integrity of the voting system can only be assured with a
>system of checks and cross-checks.
>
>
> 7) Many prominent computer scientists have said that DRE
> machines cannot be trusted. Therefore they should not
> be used.
>
>
>It's not so much that so many have said that. It's what they say about it.
>
>
> 8) If added to a DRE machine, a voter-verified paper trail
> allows the voter to satisfy herself that her voting preferences
> have been recognized correctly by the machine. Therefore,
> the voter-verified paper trail solves every one of the
> aforementioned problems and every DRE machine should
> be required to have one.
>
>
>No one is making this argument. This is a pure strawman.
>
>
>Shamos rambles on saying, "Since the Industrial Revolution, man has chosen
>to rely on machines for tasks.." This part has some interesting points, but
>none of it has anything to do with paperless voting. We all know that
>technologies bring various risks as well as advantages. Shamos completely
>misses the point.
>
>
>The point with DREs is the possibility of rigged elections with no
>possibility of recovering how voters actually voted. We are suspicious of
>malicious insiders, and for good reason. If conspirators are given a way to
>throw an election, we must assume they will try since we know it has been
>done in the past. Cheaters are everywhere.
>
>
>If there is a large enough conspiracy, no amount of careful voting system
>design can prevent it. However, we can make a conspiracy unlikely by
>requiring such a large amount of cooperation that it is bound to fail. The
>weakest voting system would be one where a single conspirator could throw an
>election. Paperless voting introduces the possibility that a single person
>with the requisite knowledge and access could throw an election. We can
>also imagine scenarios with a few insiders with a few outside confederates
>that could change the outcome of an election.
>
>
>Shamos argues that we can make aircraft software reliable, so we can trust
>software for voting machines without the need for a paper audit trail. His
>analogy does not hold. The threat model is not similar. Safety in aircraft
>software is a goal common to all involved. Everyone wants it to be safe to
>fly. Shamos mentions that planes have been deliberately crashed but this is
>extremely rare.
>
>
>We find substantial agreement in Section 3.2 regarding open source. Shamos
>concludes, "On the other hand, there is no reason that the ballot setup,
>display, tabulation and reporting sections of voting system code should be
>kept secret, and manufacturers would be wise to accede to public demand in
>this regard."
>
>
>Section 3.3 has some good suggestions for handling DREs, but doesn't this
>also show some of the hidden costs of DREs? More time, expertise, manpower,
>etc. are needed to ensure the integrity of these machines.
>
>
>I fully agree with Section 3.4. Probably, Shamos was not talking about the
>OVC as coordinator of this federally funded effort to develop standards.
>But I think we are developing a very strong group of scientists and
>engineers that could do this work.
>
>
>In section 3.5, Shamos talks about some parallel testing that was employed
>with DREs. He admits that it has limited value. But it's worse than that.
>This type of testing is very expensive since it requires another DRE for
>each pollsite, and can only find certain types of problems that are unlikely
>to occur. He says, "It is designed to detect the nightmare scenario in which
>some agent has tampered with every machine in the jurisdiction undetectably,
>a major risk cited by DRE opponents to justify the addition of paper
>trails." It really has almost no value the way it is described because it
>wouldn't even detect what he says it is designed to detect. That is, it's
>possible that every machine has been tampered with while parallel testing
>would not detect it because the tester does not know the trigger for putting
>the machine in rigged mode.
>
>
>Shamos is at his absolute worst when he says, in effect, to the people that
>say these machines could be rigged (or have been rigged), "show me." He
>wants people to show him how this has been done or could be done. It
>apparently means something to him if no one shows him.
>
>
>Why would anyone be willing to show him? Consider the case of slot machine
>rigger, Ronald Harris. Suppose you were defending the slot machines for
>their lack of bias. Would it be particularly meaningful to issue a
>challenge to see if anyone could hack one of these machines? Before he was
>caught, would Ronald Harris have been interested in meeting your challenge?
>Even if you offered a reward of $10,000 or more, why would Harris be
>interested in revealing his scheme when he could reap hundreds of thousands
>or even millions by keeping his secret? In fact, Harris was a slot machine
>examiner that figured out a way to insert code such that the machine would
>payout the jackpot if you inserted coins in a certain pattern. If you know
>the combination ("signal string"), you get the jackpot: Otherwise, it
>behaves just like every other slot machine (Harris was only caught because
>his confederate acted very suspiciously after winning a $100,000 jackpot,
>and Harris was found in the confederate's hotel room).
>
>
>Now consider the stakes involved in just local elections. Billion dollar
>projects have been won or lost with a single vote in the City Council.
>Local officials are often involved in decisions that involve many millions
>of dollars. If someone has figured out a scheme for rigging voting
>machines, they will not be interested in telling you about it for the same
>reason Harris would not have been interested in telling you about his slot
>machine rigging scheme. If they have successfully tested the scheme in an
>election, they would be guilty of a felony and probably will not want to
>admit that. Furthermore, if they took such a risk, they probably are
>expecting some large future rewards. They may be hoping to make millions by
>throwing a single local election. They won't be interested in telling
>anyone about it in advance (other than co-conspirators).
>
>
>After strenuously arguing that it couldn't be done, Shamos seems to admit
>that it could be done. But he dismisses the threat because it would only be
>local.
>
>
>"It is possible that in a conspiracy a tamperer's confederate could, while
>voting, provide information via touchscreen selections or the write-in panel
>that could inform the software of the particular voting positions to
>manipulate. However such an act would have local effect only, since it
>would take one confederate for each voting machine involved. It would not
>be feasible to perform manipulation on a large scale with such a scheme."
>
>
>Is Shamos trying to say that unless you can overcome a several percent
>difference nationwide in a presidential contest that it's not important? I
>don't think we can dismiss "local effects." As previously mentioned, local
>contests (City Council, County Supervisor, ballot measures, etc) can carry
>very large financial impacts. And local effects could even decide a
>national contest in a Florida 2000 situation where a few hundred votes swung
>one way or the other could make the difference. The voting system is as bad
>as its weakest link. Even if a particular type of manipulation cannot be
>done on a large scale, it is unacceptable to permit it.
>
>
>4. Answering the Objections
>-----------------------------
>Shamos goes over each of the eight objections he identified at the outset
>and attempts to summarize how he has defeated these objections. Some of
>these summaries are truly incredible. For objection no. 7 (computer
>scientists say DREs are bad), he uses his estimate that "About 100 of them
>have signed a resolution in favor of paper trails proposed by
>www.verifiedvoting.org" to conclude that "the other 9,999 out of 10,000 have
>remained open-minded on the subject." His math here is positively shameful.
>The ACM poll is currently running 95% against DREs (in favor of voter
>verified paper trails). The list of independent (i.e., those not on the
>payroll of DRE makers) computer scientists speaking out in favor of DREs
>seems to begin and end with Shamos.
>
>
>Finally, Shamos cites voter disenfranchisement due to poor absentee ballot
>systems. He says, "If computer scientists are truly concerned about threats
>to democracy, that's one they should work on." He has mischaracterized this
>as an either/or option. This is not a choice we have to make. This is
>just another big problem-one of many-with the voting system. If we want to
>have a great voting system instead of the bad one that we have now, there is
>a lot of work to do. It's a very big job.
>
>
>Alan D.
>_______________________________________________
>OVC discuss mailing lists
>Send requests to subscribe or unsubscribe to arthur@openvotingconsortium.org
>
>
>
>

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Received on Sat Apr 30 23:17:05 2005

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