# RE: What is Data Model FOR?

From: Arthur Keller <arthur_at_kellers_dot_org>
Date: Thu Apr 29 2004 - 15:29:37 CDT

There's an archive to read. It's linked from the website, which is
worth reviewing too.

Best regards,
Arthur

At 3:15 PM -0500 4/29/04, Mark Winegar wrote:
>Perhaps not. Unless one is trying to get a handle of where this project
>is so the hard problems can emerge.
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Arthur Keller [mailto:arthur@kellers.org]
>Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 2:31 PM
>To: voting-project@lists.sonic.net
>Subject: RE: [voting-project] What is Data Model FOR?
>
>
>That much is easy to derive. Read my recent write-up on how to
>tabulate it. My counting description has some degree of innovation
>in it. Telling us we need to do the counting, not raising the hard
>problems that might arise, and not explaining how to solve the hard
>problems -- those are not useful contributions.
>
>Best regards,
>Arthur
>
>At 2:12 PM -0500 4/29/04, Mark Winegar wrote:
>>Okay. Let's assume we have a contest for city council with 5 candidates
>
>>and the elector is to choose 3 of the 5. We can create an array of 3
>>elements; council(1), council(2), and council(3). Council(1) may
>>contain the choice of candidate #3. Council(2) may contain the choice
>>of candidate #1. Finally, council(3) may contain a choice for candidate
>
>>#4. We have 3 contests, one for each seat on the council. Furthmore,
>>the placement in the array may be used to indicate rank order if
>>needed.
>>
>>Does this help?
>>
>>Mark
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Arthur Keller [mailto:arthur@kellers.org]
>>Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 11:26 AM
>>To: voting-project@lists.sonic.net
>>Subject: RE: [voting-project] What is Data Model FOR?
>>
>>
>>
>>Since ranked preference voting says: A, B, C is different than B, A, C,
>
>>there are more than 6 possible vote combinations for 3 candidates.
>>(ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, CBA are the full ones; also A, B, C, AB, BA,
>>AC, CA, BC, CB, and no choices selected. Wow, that's 16 choices. Does
>>someone have a formula in closed form for the number of possible
>>rankings for n candidates? For the full ones, its the number of
>>permutations of n candidates, or n! (n factorial).)
>>
>>You could list all the combinations and keep a count of how many times
>>each combination was a voter's selection. Or you could incrementally
>>build the list of combinations as they were encountered in the
>>canvassing, while maintaining the count of repetitions.
>>
>>Once the canvassing is completed, you can perform the appropriate
>>calculations. As long as you keep the raw counts of combinations, you
>>can do the calculation as often as you like. It's probably a good idea
>
>>to publish the raw counts of combinations so others can check your
>>final vote assignment algorithm or even do research to develop new
>>ones.
>>
>>Best regards,
>>Arthur
>>
>>At 10:36 AM -0500 4/29/04, Mark Winegar wrote:
>>>Doug,
>>>
>>>You may be able to implement the canvassing of ranked preference votes
>
>>>as a simple array of contests. This should simplify the required logic
>
>>>of the canvassing process.
>>>
>>>Mark Winegar
>>>
>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>From: Douglas W. Jones [mailto:jones@cs.uiowa.edu]
>>>Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 10:27 AM
>>>To: voting-project@lists.sonic.net
>>>Subject: Re: [voting-project] What is Data Model FOR?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>On Apr 29, 2004, at 12:48 AM, David Mertz wrote:
>>>
>>>> dr-jekyll@att.net wrote:
>>>> |Does "vote aggregation" mean vote totals? The Data Model I
>>>> submitted
>>>
>>>> |does have a place for accumulating vote totals.
>>>>
>>>> Aggregation is likely to involve move than a simple counter.
>>>> Maybe
>>
>>>> the counter suffices for a first pass, on some kinds of races. But
>>>> consider, for example either N of M or ranked-preference contests.
>>>> The tallying of rank orders involves more than just counting the
>>>> votes; for example, in IRV, it would go through stages with
>>>> reassignments of votes and recounts.
>>>
>>>I should note that the canvassing rules I proposed in my previous post
>
>>>don't apply directly to ranked preference votes, but there are
>>>generalizations that do apply. Designing canvassing procedures that
>>>allow for self-audit throughout the process is most difficult for IRV
>>>or STV systems. It is easier for weighted preference systems.
>>>
>>> Doug Jones
>>> jones@cs.uiowa.edu
>>
>>
>>--
>>-----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>-
>>-------
>>Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA 94303-4507 tel
>>+1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
>
>
>--
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>-------
>Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA 94303-4507 tel
>+1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424

```--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA  94303-4507
tel +1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
```
Received on Fri Apr 30 23:17:25 2004

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Fri Apr 30 2004 - 23:17:29 CDT