RE: What is Data Model FOR?

From: Mark Winegar <mwinegar_at_mtmc_dot_edu>
Date: Thu Apr 29 2004 - 15:15:29 CDT

Perhaps not. Unless one is trying to get a handle of where this project
is so the hard problems can emerge.

-----Original Message-----
From: Arthur Keller [mailto:arthur_at_kellers_dot_org]
Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 2:31 PM
To: voting-project@lists.sonic.net
Subject: RE: What is Data Model FOR?

That much is easy to derive. Read my recent write-up on how to
tabulate it. My counting description has some degree of innovation
in it. Telling us we need to do the counting, not raising the hard
problems that might arise, and not explaining how to solve the hard
problems -- those are not useful contributions.

Best regards,
Arthur

At 2:12 PM -0500 4/29/04, Mark Winegar wrote:
>Okay. Let's assume we have a contest for city council with 5 candidates

>and the elector is to choose 3 of the 5. We can create an array of 3
>elements; council(1), council(2), and council(3). Council(1) may
>contain the choice of candidate #3. Council(2) may contain the choice
>of candidate #1. Finally, council(3) may contain a choice for candidate

>#4. We have 3 contests, one for each seat on the council. Furthmore,
>the placement in the array may be used to indicate rank order if
>needed.
>
>Does this help?
>
>Mark
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Arthur Keller [mailto:arthur@kellers.org]
>Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 11:26 AM
>To: voting-project@lists.sonic.net
>Subject: RE: [voting-project] What is Data Model FOR?
>
>
>Mark, I'm confused by your answer.
>
>Since ranked preference voting says: A, B, C is different than B, A, C,

>there are more than 6 possible vote combinations for 3 candidates.
>(ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, CBA are the full ones; also A, B, C, AB, BA,
>AC, CA, BC, CB, and no choices selected. Wow, that's 16 choices. Does
>someone have a formula in closed form for the number of possible
>rankings for n candidates? For the full ones, its the number of
>permutations of n candidates, or n! (n factorial).)
>
>You could list all the combinations and keep a count of how many times
>each combination was a voter's selection. Or you could incrementally
>build the list of combinations as they were encountered in the
>canvassing, while maintaining the count of repetitions.
>
>Once the canvassing is completed, you can perform the appropriate
>calculations. As long as you keep the raw counts of combinations, you
>can do the calculation as often as you like. It's probably a good idea

>to publish the raw counts of combinations so others can check your
>final vote assignment algorithm or even do research to develop new
>ones.
>
>Best regards,
>Arthur
>
>At 10:36 AM -0500 4/29/04, Mark Winegar wrote:
>>Doug,
>>
>>You may be able to implement the canvassing of ranked preference votes

>>as a simple array of contests. This should simplify the required logic

>>of the canvassing process.
>>
>>Mark Winegar
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Douglas W. Jones [mailto:jones@cs.uiowa.edu]
>>Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 10:27 AM
>>To: voting-project@lists.sonic.net
>>Subject: Re: [voting-project] What is Data Model FOR?
>>
>>
>>
>>On Apr 29, 2004, at 12:48 AM, David Mertz wrote:
>>
>>> dr-jekyll@att.net wrote:
>>> |Does "vote aggregation" mean vote totals? The Data Model I
>>> submitted
>>
>>> |does have a place for accumulating vote totals.
>>>
>>> Aggregation is likely to involve move than a simple counter.
>>> Maybe
>
>>> the counter suffices for a first pass, on some kinds of races. But
>>> consider, for example either N of M or ranked-preference contests.
>>> The tallying of rank orders involves more than just counting the
>>> votes; for example, in IRV, it would go through stages with
>>> reassignments of votes and recounts.
>>
>>I should note that the canvassing rules I proposed in my previous post

>>don't apply directly to ranked preference votes, but there are
>>generalizations that do apply. Designing canvassing procedures that
>>allow for self-audit throughout the process is most difficult for IRV
>>or STV systems. It is easier for weighted preference systems.
>>
>> Doug Jones
>> jones@cs.uiowa.edu
>
>
>--
>-----------------------------------------------------------------------
>-
>-------
>Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA 94303-4507 tel
>+1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424

-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------
Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA  94303-4507 tel
+1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
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Received on Fri Apr 30 23:17:25 2004

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