RE: What is Data Model FOR?

From: Mark Winegar <mwinegar_at_mtmc_dot_edu>
Date: Thu Apr 29 2004 - 15:07:49 CDT

Well, let's consider the nature of a spoiled ballot. Isn't it a ballot
that is invalid because a choice has been made that presents an
exception to the rule. We can capture the exception through validity
testing before the data is entered and allow the elector to make a valid
choice thereby saving the ballot. I think that's a good thing.

I was thinking it would be more valid in that it faithfully count to
contests acurately and it would also represent those ballots that
somehow didn't get into the ballot box. Which brings forward another
question, "How do we prevent hardcopy ballots from be lost?"


-----Original Message-----
From: Arthur Keller []
Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 2:00 PM
Subject: RE: [voting-project] What is Data Model FOR?


The computer count is NOT more accurate than the paper count. The
computer count includes spoiled paper ballots.

Please think it through and make suggestions on HOW it should be
done. We already know that it needs to be done.

Otherwise, we're just spinning our wheels and getting nowhere.


Best regards,

At 1:28 PM -0500 4/29/04, Mark Winegar wrote:
>Yes, there has to be a better process of managing the paper ballots
>because it appears that the computer count is more accurate than the
>paper count. In what ways can the paper count be improved?
>Local reconciliation probably isn't a bad thing.
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Arthur Keller []
>Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 11:13 AM
>Subject: RE: [voting-project] What is Data Model FOR?
>At 10:32 AM -0500 4/29/04, Mark Winegar wrote:
>>Better accuracy is often achieved by eliminating the humor error
>>In both scenarios discussed below there are opportunities for the
>>error factor to contaminate the canvassing. We can improve the whole
>>process by having two distinct canvassing processes; one based on the
>>voter's computer input and the other based on paper ballots. I believe

>>the comparison of these distinct data sets will help detect, and
>>prevent, tampering.
>>Mark Winegar
>Actually, our approach is to reconcile the paper and electronic as
>early as feasible after the polls close. Once you've done that,
>distinct canvassing systems compounds the discrepancies. There can be
>discrepancies between paper and electronic, such as spoiled ballots.
>Or ballots never deposited in the ballot box. Unless you reconcile as
>locally as feasible, it's hard to effectively reconcile in larger
>contexts. And when you expect there to be discrepancies (spoiled
>ballots), you have to drill down anyway.
>Best regards,
>Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA 94303-4507 tel
>+1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424

Arthur M. Keller, Ph.D., 3881 Corina Way, Palo Alto, CA  94303-4507 tel
+1(650)424-0202, fax +1(650)424-0424
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Received on Fri Apr 30 23:17:24 2004

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