Re: Left off the ballot?

From: David Jefferson <d_jefferson_at_yahoo_dot_com>
Date: Thu Apr 15 2004 - 14:57:53 CDT

I have another hack to add to my list of things that VVPAT alone
cannot protect against. The DRE software could reverse two
propositions on the ballot, so that the description of (say)
Prop 57 and Prop 59 are exchanged on screen, inducing voters wto
vote in favor of Prop 57 (extending school to 6 days per week)
when his real intent was to vote for Prop 59 (more pay for
teachers), and vice versa.

Again, IF voters take an official paper sample ballot with them
into the polling place, and IF they carefully compare it to what
is shown on screen, this hack is in principle detectable. But
what we are doing is requiring a second distinct uses of paper
in the "electronic" voting process, and also extending the
voter's verification duties to verifying that the blank ballot
on screen is correct in that it matches the printed sample
ballot, in addition to verifying that the ballot image printed
by the machine is correct in that it captures his voting intent.
 This is getting pretty onerous. The voter might wonder what
the computer is for if he has to deal with paper in two distinct
ways, and must check both the on-screen display of the ballot
and also the printed ballot image containing his votes!

I have no answer here--just the observation.

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Received on Fri Apr 30 23:17:07 2004

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