Baltimore Sun -- Apr 1, Mike Himowitz

From: Alan Dechert <alan_at_openvotingconsortium_dot_org>
Date: Fri Apr 02 2004 - 15:51:57 CST

http://www.baltimoresun.com/technology/custom/pluggedin/bal-pl.himowitz01apr01,0,4595991.column?coll=bal-pe-pluggedin

Open system might plug up holes in the e-voting process
Mike Himowitz
Apr 1, 2004

WHILE ELECTION officials, lawmakers and critics in Maryland and other
states squabble over the reliability of electronic voting systems, a
small group of computer scientists and engineers has been developing one
that might actually work.

The Open Voting Consortium is scheduled to demonstrate a prototype today
in San Jose, Calif. You can try a version yourself on the Web at
www.openvotingconsortium.org.

Although it's far from a finished product, the system retains what's
good about current electronic voting systems. It's voter-friendly,
easier than older systems to administer, and accessible to blind voters
without assistance.

It also addresses the concerns of today's critics. First, it uses
open-source software that's available for public inspection -
eliminating the secrecy that outrages critics of today's proprietary
"black box" systems.

Second, the software is free and can run on a variety of computer
platforms, which makes the system cheaper to acquire and maintain.
Third, it creates a paper trail of printed ballots that can be counted
by hand or machine in case of disputed elections - without compromising
privacy for the blind.

Unfortunately, the system may come too late to prevent disasters in the
next round of elections. To understand why, it takes a bit of history.

In response to the Florida fiasco of 2000, which left the presidential
election in limbo and millions of voters disgusted with the system,
Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002. It provides $3.9
billion to help states replace lever-based voting machines and
discredited punch-card ballots with electronic systems.

Although HAVA doesn't forbid scanned paper-ballot systems, which have
worked reliably for years, it does require states to equip each poll
with a voting terminal accessible to the blind without assistance. As a
result, most states have chosen Direct Recording Electronic systems, or
DREs, that use touch-screen computers to record votes and provide add-on
audio equipment to guide blind voters.

Early on, election officials ignored critics - including many computer
scientists - who warned that electronic systems were open to sabotage,
tampering and vote-fixing - particularly without the safety of a paper
record of each ballot.

Critics also complained that these systems use proprietary software from
their vendors to tabulate and store votes - code that's not available to
the public. In essence, the most critical part of the election -
counting the votes - had been snatched from public view and stashed away
in a "black box."

The response from election administrators and voting system vendors:
"Trust us."

After a series of embarrassing glitches and exposures of security
defects, some states, including California and Ohio, are considering
requiring that electronic systems print voter-verified "receipts" that
can be stored and used in recounts of disputed elections.

Legislators in Maryland, which bought a $56 million Diebold touch-screen
system that two security consultants separately have criticized, are
considering similar legislation, although it's unlikely to pass this
year.

Advocates for the blind threaten lawsuits over the paper trail
proposals, arguing that any system relying on paper verification
discriminates against the visually impaired.

While these debates raged over the summer and fall, a group of computer
scientists and civic activists who had been working on designs for
electronic voting systems for years - mostly in California - formed the
Open Voting Consortium to develop a system that's electronic, secure and
blind-accessible.

Instead of printing a "receipt" that confirms a ballot cast
electronically, it's based on the quaint notion that the best ballot is
still a paper ballot. "We didn't see any reason to reinvent the wheel,"
said Fred McLain, the project's lead software developer.

In the consortium's system, the voting terminal can be a touch screen
like today's electronic touch-screens, with the same type of audio
accessories for blind voters. But the terminal's main job, once the
voter is finished, is to print a paper ballot that identifies the
voter's choices - along with a bar code that records the information in
computer-readable form.

Once the voter is satisfied, he puts the ballot into a locked box. To
verify their ballots, blind voters can hide their printed choices in a
security folder and run the bar code under a verifying scanner, which
reads back their votes through headphones - eliminating the paper
ballot's privacy concerns.

When the polls close, the ballots are scanned on a separate tabulating
system. Election judges can compare the scanned totals with those stored
in the voting terminals to see if there are any discrepancies. The
original ballots are still available to settle disputes - and unlike
scanned paper ballots in older systems, the voter's choices are always
clearly marked.

"That is a profound difference," said Alan Dechert, the consortium's
president. "With a DRE, when you say 'Cast my ballot,' the vote exists
in a database. In this system, it says, 'Print my ballot' - the
authentic vote is on paper."

Like the "receipt" system, the Open Voting Consortium's plan would add a
printer to the mix -- a clunky piece of equipment most election
administrators would like to avoid. It also adds an optical scanner, yet
another potential source of problems. But the setup adds a measure of
security, too - hackers would have to compromise two separate computer
systems without being detected to rig an election.

The other major difference in the Open Voting system is the nature of
the software that counts the votes. Open-source software is developed by
a group of programmers who publish their code and invite others to
attack it or offer suggestions for improvements.

Traditional software companies hate open-source software because no one
owns it or collects royalties for it. But the process works. The Linux
operating system, now used on millions of servers around the world, is a
premier example of open source software. Computer experts say Linux is
far more secure than Microsoft Windows - largely because friendly
hackers have examined it closely and suggested improvements that help
keep intruders out.

Dechert said the Open Voting Consortium will spend the coming months
demonstrating its system to election administrators around the country.

It's an uphill battle, because so many - like those in Maryland - have
committed millions to proprietary systems and have little inclination to
admit a mistake. Likewise, vendors of electronic systems have invested
heavily in lobbyists, marketing teams and political contributions to
keep their share of the e-voting billions.

But all would do well to take a look. It just might work.

==================================================================
= The content of this message, with the exception of any external
= quotations under fair use, are released to the Public Domain
==================================================================
Received on Fri Apr 30 23:17:01 2004

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Fri Apr 30 2004 - 23:17:29 CDT